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ANNUAL REVIEW OF SEX RESEARCH SPECIAL ISSUE 
 
Scrutinizing Immutability: Research on Sexual Orientation and U.S. Legal Advocacy for 
Sexual Minorities 
 
Lisa M. Diamond 
 
Clifford J. Rosky 
 
We review scientific research and legal authorities to argue that the immutability of sexual orientation should no longer 
be invoked as a foundation for the rights of individuals with same-sex attractions and relationships (i.e., sexual 
minorities). On the basis of scientific research as well as U.S. legal rulings regarding lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) 
rights, we make three claims: First, arguments based on the immutability of sexual orientation are unscientific, given 
what we now know from longitudinal, population-based studies of naturally occurring changes in the same-sex 
attractions of some individuals over time. Second, arguments based on the immutability of sexual orientation are 
unnecessary, in light of U.S. legal decisions in which courts have used grounds other than immutability to protect the 
rights of sexual minorities. Third, arguments about the immutability of sexual orientation are unjust, because they 
imply that same-sex attractions are inferior to other-sex attractions, and because they privilege sexual minorities who 
experience their sexuality as fixed over those who experience their sexuality as fluid. We conclude that the legal rights 
of individuals with same-sex attractions and relationships should not be framed as if they depend on a certain pattern 
of scientific findings regarding sexual orientation. 
 
In the 2015 landmark decision recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a question that has long occupied an 
uncomfortable intersection between science and law: Is sexual orientation an “immutable” 
characteristic? In striking down state laws against same-sex marriage, the Court declared that, in 
recent years, “psychiatrists and others [have] recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal 
expression of human sexuality and immutable” (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015, p. 8). The Court 
reasoned that, because sexual orientation is immutable, the petitioners had no real choice but to 
enter same-sex relationships: “[T]heir immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only 
real path to this profound commitment” (p. 4).  
In more colloquial terms, the Court has finally picked sides in the age-old nature/nurture 
debate over sexual orientation: Are lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals “born that way,” or 
do they have any choice in their sexuality? Although this is a fundamentally scientific question, it has 
been repeatedly posed in political debates about LGB rights. As a result, scientific research has been 
repeatedly invoked by both advocates and opponents of laws protecting individuals with same-sex 
sexual orientations (reviewed in Halley, 1994; Hammack & Windell, 2011; Mucciaroni & Killian, 
2004; Stein, 2014). Specifically, advocates for the rights of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals have used 
scientific research on the immutability of sexual orientation to argue that anti-LGB laws violate the 
U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, given that the immutability of sexual orientation is one 
factor that courts have historically considered to determine the constitutionality of such laws. 
Our goal is to provide a comprehensive review of the current scientific and legal status of 
the claim that sexual orientation is immutable, with the goal of demonstrating that immutability 
should no longer be invoked as a foundation for the rights of individuals with same-sex attractions 
and relationships (a group we refer to collectively as sexual minorities). We make three specific c 
claims regarding immutability arguments for the rights of sexual minorities, with special attention 
devoted to the issue of same-sex marriage in U.S. law. First, arguments based on the immutability of 
sexual orientation are unscientific c, given that scientific research does not indicate that sexual 
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orientation is uniformly biologically determined at birth or that patterns of same-sex and other-sex 
attractions remain fixed over the life course. Second, arguments based on the immutability of sexual 
orientation are unnecessary, in light of two decades of U.S. legal decisions—including the most 
recent Supreme Court rulings on same-sex marriage—in which courts have used grounds other than 
immutability to protect the rights of sexual minorities. Third, arguments about the immutability of 
sexual orientation are unjust, because they imply that same-sex attractions are inferior to other-sex 
attractions, and because they privilege sexual minorities who experience their sexuality as fixed over 
those who experience their sexuality as fluid. 
Bisexuality is particularly critical to consider in this regard. Individuals with bisexual 
attractions and/or behaviors have been largely missing from both scientific and legal debates about 
the immutability of sexual orientation (Boucai, 2012; Rust, 2000c; Yoshino, 2000), no doubt because 
their very existence, and the sheer diversity of bisexual pathways and experiences, troubles the rigid 
categorical distinction between homosexuality and heterosexuality on which immutability debates 
have been premised (Firestein, 1996; Rust, 2000b, 2000c, 2009; Yoshino, 2000). Of course, the 
rigidly bounded categories of “homosexual” and “heterosexual” are themselves products of culture, 
history, and cognition (D’ Emilio, 1983; Foucault, 1980; Herdt, 1990), and many other cultures have 
more fluid conceptions of gender and sexuality that more easily accommodate bisexuality or that 
organize sexual identities and relations around dimensions of age, power, gender, and social class 
rather than (or in addition to) exclusive patterns of same-sex or other-sex desire (Blackwood, 2000; 
Cardoso & Werner, 2013; Herdt & Boxer, 1995; Murray, 2000). Analysis of such cultural differences 
is beyond the scope of our discussion, but we want to highlight that the theoretical and legal 
challenges posed by bisexuality flow directly from the West’s longstanding overemphasis on 
homosexual and heterosexual categories of personhood (Sedgwick, 1990). As we address in the third 
section of this article, such categories fail to represent the true diversity of sexual-minority 
experience.  
Importantly, our focus on same-sex sexuality necessarily neglects other forms of sexual 
diversity. Scientists and advocates have debated the causes, implications, and legal status of a diverse 
range of sexual-minority experiences and identities over the past several decades, including 
polyamory (e.g., openly maintaining more than one intimate relationship at a time), asexuality (e.g., 
experiencing no sexual attractions), transgender identity and gender variance, and nonnormative 
erotic practices such as sadomasochism (for relevant reviews, see Emens, 2014; Halberstam, 2005; 
Kleinplatz & Diamond, 2013; Minter, 2012; Seto, Abramowitz, & Barbaree, 2008; Tweedy, 2011). 
Immutability arguments have relevance for all such forms of sexual and gender diversity, but we 
constrain our focus to sexual orientation because the legal debates over same-sex marriage have 
provided the most well-developed “laboratory” for investigating the stakes of immutability claims 
for sexual-minority rights. As other marginalized groups increasingly advocate for social and legal 
recognition, we expect that the present analysis will clarify the shortcomings of using immutability 
claims to protect gender and sexual expression in other settings. 
 
Background on Immutability Arguments in Science and Law 
 
For more than 50 years, opponents of the rights of sexual minorities have argued that same-
sex relationships represent deviant lifestyle choices that should be socially discouraged, and 
advocates for sexual minorities have countered by arguing that sexual orientation is a fixed, 
biologically based trait that cannot be chosen or changed (Burr, 1996; Caramagno, 2002; Halley, 
1994; LeVay, 2011; Mucciaroni&Killian, 2004; Stein, 2014). These arguments have borrowed their 
logic from civil rights claims regarding race and ethnicity, essentially claiming that individuals must 
not be persecuted “on the basis of something about themselves that is fundamentally determined” 
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(Vargas & O’ Donnell, 2013, p. 4). The “born/chosen” debate was specifically invoked in amicus 
curiae briefs filed to the Supreme Court United States v. Windsor and Perry v. Hollingsworth, the 
2013 cases on same-sex marriage. For example, Paul McHugh, a psychiatrist at Johns Hopkins, 
argued in his amicus curiae brief that an equal protection claim could not be made on behalf of 
sexual minorities because the scientific evidence failed to show that they were a discrete group 
sharing an immutable trait (McHugh, 2013). The Gay and Lesbian Medical Association submitted 
their own amicus curiae brief, titled “On the Immutability of Sexual Orientation” (Vargas & O’ 
Donnell, 2013), which challenged McHugh’s argument and cited a different set of scientific findings 
to show that sexual orientation was biologically based rather than chosen.  
The final decisions in the Windsor and Perry cases did not, in the end, take up the 
immutability question. And although the Obergefell v. Hodges decision made reference to the 
immutability of sexual orientation, the concept of immutability played a gratuitous role in the legal 
reasoning underlying this landmark ruling. Hence, we think it is high time to retire immutability 
approaches to sexual-minority rights. We are certainly not the first to make this argument (Bruni, 
2012; deBoer, 2015; Halley, 1994; Mucciaroni & Killian, 2004; Warren, 2009). Halley, in particular, 
published a powerful critique of the immutability approach to sexual-minority rights more than 20 
years ago, which remains as pertinent as ever (Halley, 1994). Nonetheless, immutability claims 
continue to permeate social discourse 
about the rights of sexual minorities (e.g., Copland, 2015; Ghose, 2015; Khan, 2015; Rahman, 2015). 
The climate may finally be ripe for lasting change. We hope that our review of scientific findings and 
legal rulings regarding immutability will deal these arguments a final and fatal blow.  
We begin with a detailed review of scientific evidence on sexual orientation showing that 
immutability claims have been oversimplified and overgeneralized. We then review recent U.S. court 
decisions on same-sex marriage, demonstrating the numerous successful legal arguments for the civil 
rights of sexual minorities which do not depend on the claim that sexual orientation is immutable—
at least not in the traditional sense meaning that it cannot be chosen or changed. Finally, we 
conclude by arguing that scientists and legal scholars, within their respective domains, must not 
privilege the needs and experiences of sexual minorities who experience their attractions as 
immutable over those who do not.  
Because our argument concerns the intersection between science and the law, we include 
considerable detail on both scientific findings and legal rulings. This format may seem jarring to 
readers who are more accustomed to purely scientific reviews (which are typically unconcerned with 
the legal implications of their findings) and purely legal reviews (which are typically unconcerned 
with the precise details of the scientific findings they cite). Yet we believe an analysis that jointly 
tackles the scientific and legal basis of immutability arguments is critical to the future contribution of 
science to the public interest. 
 
IMMUTABILITY CLAIMS ARE UNSCIENTIFIC 
 
One fact about sexual orientation garners near-universal agreement from scientists: It has no 
single cause (reviewed in Bailey et al., in press). Rather, multiple biological and nonbiological factors 
interact to shape the adult expression of same-sex sexuality, and the mix of causal factors may differ 
from person to person, and for males versus females. We focus here on genetic and neuroendocrine 
contributions to same-sex sexuality because these contributions have the strongest empirical 
support. Our summary is necessarily abbreviated, and we refer readers to more comprehensive 
reviews for greater detail (Bailey et al., in press; Bao & Swaab, 2011; Hill, Dawood, & Puts, 2013; 
Rahman, 2005).  
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Before turning to the evidence, it is important to note that sexual orientation is not easy to 
define or measure. This obviously poses a problem for research on the causes of sexual orientation, 
given that the first step in such research is to identify individuals with different sexual orientations. 
Sexual orientation is a multifaceted phenomenon, incorporating sexual attractions, sexual arousal, 
sexual fantasy, sexual behavior, and sexual identity (reviewed in Bailey et al., in press; Klein, 
Sepekoff, & Wolf, 1985; Rosario & Schrimshaw, 2014). Different researchers have emphasized 
different facets, and the facets themselves do not always coincide. For example, many individuals 
report same-sex attractions or sexual arousal in the absence of a gay/lesbian/ bisexual identity, and 
many individuals report bisexual patterns of attraction but pursue exclusively same-sex or othersex 
relationships (Chivers & Bailey, 2005; Cramer, Chevalier, Gemberling, Stroud, & Graham, 2015; 
Igartua, Thombs, Burgos, & Montoro, 2009; Lhomond, Saurel-Cubizolles, & Michaels, 2014; 
Matthews, Blosnich, Farmer, & Adams, 2014; Starks, Nadler, Sagrestano, & Sarvela, 2009).  
Cultural factors often contribute to discrepancies between individuals’ sexual identities, 
attractions, and behaviors. Mustanski, Birkett, et al. (2014) pooled two national probability samples, 
yielding a combined sample size of more than 50,000, to examine ethnic differences in the 
associations between behavior and identity. Youth in each sexual identity group (gay/lesbian, 
heterosexual, bisexual) were described as concordant if their identity matched their pattern of 
behavior (e.g., gay/lesbian youth reporting exclusively same-sex behavior; bisexual youth reporting 
mixed behavior), and discordant if their identity did not match their pattern of behavior. Black and 
Hispanic youths in the gay/lesbian group were more likely to be discordant than Whites, yet Black 
youths in the bisexual group were less likely to be discordant than Whites. The reasons for these 
differences are not clear, but variation across ethnic groups in the meanings attached to same-sex 
sexuality likely plays a role. Adolescents who are trying to decide whether they are gay, bisexual, 
confused, or experimenting will necessarily look to the knowledge, experiences, values, and norms 
of their local communities, and different ethnic communities will provide sharply different answers. 
Some communities may discount the relevance of same-sex attractions or behavior, and others may 
provide no route for youth to develop lesbian, gay, or bisexual identities while maintaining their 
ethnic identities (Chan, 1995; Consolacion, Russell, & Sue, 2004; Jamil, Harper, & Fernandez, 2009; 
McLean, 2003; Parks, Hughes, & Matthews, 2004). 
Given the degree to which identity and behavior are structured by social context, social 
constraints, and social opportunities, most researchers treat sexual attractions as the primary 
indicator of an individual’s underlying sexual orientation (Mustanski, Van Wagenen, Birkett, Eyster, 
& Corliss, 2014). Yet even attractions do not provide a perfect index, given that they can be 
influenced by a range of factors other than sexual orientation, such as opportunities to encounter 
desirable same-sex and other-sex individuals (Diamond, 2003). Although our review will employ the 
standard scientific (and lay) practice of using the term sexual orientation to denote a consistent 
pattern of same-sex and/or other-sex sexual attraction, we want to emphasize that none of the 
studies reviewed here can claim to have definatively assessed the core construct of sexual 
orientation, given its inherently multidimensional nature. (We will revisit this issue in more detail 
when discussing the question of whether some individuals can “choose” their orientation.)  
 
Genetic Contributions to Sexual Orientation 
 
Before we review the extant data on genetic contributions to sexual orientation, a caution is 
in order: The field of behavioral genetics is currently undergoing a paradigm shift that challenges 
conventional understandings of genetic inheritance (reviewed in Charney, 2012; Richardson & 
Stevens, 2015) due to emerging understandings of phenomena such as epigenetic regulation. 
Epigenetics focuses on chemical mechanisms that alter the expression of genes at different points in 
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the organism’s life cycle, essentially switching certain genes on and off in response to certain 
environmental influences. These environmentally released changes can have significant and lasting 
consequences for the phenotypic expression of genetically influenced traits, and can even be passed 
down to future generations, directly challenging traditional models of genetic inheritance. Whereas 
previous behavioral genetic research viewed the DNA sequence as a fixed genetic record 
constituting the sole mechanism for the inheritance of traits, newer research focuses on the 
epigenome: the complex constellation of chemical compounds which are not part of the DNA 
sequence itself but which attach to it and alter gene expression at different stages of the life cycle in 
response to environmental influences.  
Epigenetics opens up exciting new possibilities for investigating the genetic bases of 
complex traits such as sexual orientation (see Ngun & Vilain, 2014; Rice, Friberg, & 
Gavrilets, 2012). In fact, recent studies using epigenetic models have proven more successful in 
explaining population variance in same-sex sexuality than studies using conventional genetic models 
(Ngun et al., 2015). Therefore, future research on the genetics of sexual orientation may increasingly 
focus on environmentally released changes in gene expression and how these changes are passed 
down, rather than the simple presence or absence of certain genes at birth. In essence, the current 
scientific revolution in our understanding of the human epigenome challenges the very notion of 
being “born gay,” along with the notion of being “born” with any complex trait. Rather, our genetic 
legacy is dynamic, developmental, and environmentally embedded. 
The paradigm-shifting insights emerging from postgenomic research (Richardson & Stevens, 
2015) can make it difficult to interpret the findings of older studies using traditional behavioral 
genetic methodologies, such as twin concordance studies and genome-wide association scans. Yet 
these are precisely the methods that have been used to study sexual orientation. Findings from these 
studies (reviewed in this article) still make critical contributions to our understanding of the genetics 
of sexual orientation, but we expect that our interpretation of these findings will change in future 
years as postgenomic approaches are increasingly applied to the complex phenomenon of same-sex 
sexuality. 
With this in mind, what have we learned about sexual orientation from conventional 
behavioral genetic methods? These methods have focused on the heritability of sexual orientation 
(i.e., the degree to which same-sex sexuality runs in families) and the existence of specific genetic 
markers associated with same-sex sexuality. Both of these lines of research have found significant 
evidence for genetic contributions to same-sex sexuality, but neither suggests that sexual orientation 
is genetically determined. A recent review of the most reliable scientific studies (Bailey et al., in 
press) estimated that the heritability of sexual orientation is approximately.32, meaning that 32% of 
the population variability in sexual orientation is due to genetic factors. (Note that this says nothing 
about the degree to which a single individual’s sexual orientation is genetically influenced; heritability 
estimates concern variability between persons in a population, not the balance of genetic and 
environmental influences within persons.)  
To provide a basis of comparison, it is helpful to note that higher estimates of heritability 
(ranging from.4 to.6) have been found for a range of characteristics that are not widely considered 
immutable, such as being divorced, smoking, having low back pain, and feeling body dissatisfaction 
(Ferreira, Beckenkamp, Maher, Hopper, & Ferreira, 2013; Jocklin, McGue, & Lykken, 1996; Keski-
Rahkonen et al., 2005; Lessov-Schlaggar, Kristjansson, Bucholz, Heath, & Madden, 2012). Bailey 
and colleagues (in press) concluded from their review that sexual orientation is somewhat—but not 
mostly—genetic, and that it is unquestioningly influenced by environmental factors, given the 
relatively low concordance of same-sex orientation in identical twins. Concordance refers to the 
probability that an individual is gay given that his or her identical twin is gay. Across the most 
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reliable twin registry studies available, the median concordance estimate for sexual orientation 
among identical twins is.25. In summary, despite the fact that identical twins share 100% of their 
genes, gay/gay twin pairs are less common than gay/straight twin pairs. The twin data clearly show a 
genetic contribution to sexuality (because even a twin concordance as low as.25 is significantly 
greater than would be expected by chance, given the low base rate of same-sex sexuality in the 
population), but not genetic determination (which would produce perfect concordance in identical 
twins). 
Other approaches to investigating genetic influences on sexual orientation have focused on 
identifying specific genetic variants associated with same-sex sexuality. Several comprehensive 
reviews of these data are available (Dawood, Bailey, & Martin, 2009; Hill et al., 2013), and so we 
focus on one of the largest recent studies, whose findings align with the findings of other similar 
studies. Researchers analyzed the genomes of more than 23,000 men and women that had been 
collected by the company 23andMe, and found no genetic loci that were significantly associated with 
sexual orientation in either men or women (Drabant et al., 2012). However, the marker that came 
closest to statistical significance among men was located on pericentromeric chromosome 8, a 
region which had been identified as a possible marker for male sexual orientation in a previous 
genomewide association study (Mustanski et al., 2005). As with the findings of heritability, this 
supports a genetic contribution to sexual orientation, but not genetic determination.  
Across all genetic research there has been consistently stronger evidence for genetic 
influence on male sexual orientation than on female sexual orientation (Bailey et al., in press; Hyde, 
2005; Mustanski, Chivers, & Bailey, 2002). No specific genetic markers appear to be reliably 
associated with female same-sex sexuality, and heritability estimates for female sexual orientation 
have varied more widely across different studies than the heritability estimates for male sexual 
orientation. This might suggest that different genes contribute to female same-sex sexuality than 
male same-sex sexuality, and it might also be due to the existence of more variable social controls on 
female than male same-sex sexuality. Although female sexuality has historically been subject to more 
social control than male sexuality (Baumeister & Twenge, 2002), stigmatization of homosexuality is 
typically greater for men than for women (reviewed in Mondimore, 1996). Variable social controls 
create variable contexts for the expression of genetic predispositions. The heritability of smoking 
provides an apt analogy, given that social attitudes about smoking (like social attitudes about same-
sex sexuality) have changed over time and vary widely across different cultures and communities. As 
Boardman, Blalock, and Pampel (2010) summarized, “When smoking is widely accepted and 
common, social incentives and motivations to smoke may overwhelm the influence of genetic 
characteristics. However, when smoking involves controversy over its dangers and the weighing of 
costs and benefits by individuals, genetic influences may better predict smoking —social smokers 
with less physical dependence do more to avoid smoking than those with genetic propensities for 
physical dependence” (p. 109). Similarly, the greater and more consistent stigmatization of male 
same-sex sexuality than female same-sex sexuality should allow genetic propensities to play a greater 
and more consistent role in the expression of male than female same-sex sexuality. If cultural 
attitudes toward female and male sexuality become more similar in the future, then gender 
differences in the heritability of sexual orientation may change. 
Before leaving the topic of genetics, we want to call attention to the cultural privileging of 
genetic “origin stories.” As Halley (1994) noted, one of the factors that fed the increasing 
prominence of immutability claims for sexual-minority rights in the 1990s was the “cultural success 
of genetics as a source of knowledge about who we are as humans” (p. 512), fostered by the success 
of the Human Genome Project. If anything, this fascination with genetic origin stories has only 
intensified, spurred by the growth of commercial industries purporting to reveal one’s own 
personalized genetic heritage for a fee. Genetic information has also been increasingly used to 
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investigate and verify the relatedness of cultural groups (most notably indigenous peoples, as shown 
by TallBear, 2007, 2008), and such practices starkly posit genetics as the ultimate authority on 
human origins, families, and “types.” Although some hope that genetic science will eventually help 
dismantle systems of oppression by revealing the shared genetic heritage linking disparate groups, 
genetic science is embedded within larger social and economic systems that typically seek to 
entrench rather than challenge social hierarchies (TallBear, 2013). Following this reasoning, it may be 
naive to expect that the identification of a genetic basis for same-sex sexuality will promote its 
acceptance and social legitimation. Certainly, some individuals would view such findings as further 
evidence that homosexuality is a disease to be controlled rather than a form of human diversity 
(Greenberg & Bailey, 2001; Sedgwick, 1990).  
 
Neuroendocrine Contributions to Sexual Orientation  
 
Although genetic studies of sexual orientation typically receive the lion’s share of attention 
by journalists, lawyers, and advocates, an equally active line of research concerns exposure to 
perinatal hormones, sometimes called the neuroendocrine model. The neuroendocrine model is not 
in competition with genetic models but simply focuses on a different and more specific underlying 
mechanism. Specifically, this model proposes that variations in exposure to androgens and estrogens 
in utero may shape later sexual orientation. Prenatal hormonal exposure in utero has 
welldocumented organizational effects on the developing fetal brain, creating sex differences in 
regions including the hypothalamus, the septum, the preoptic area, and the amygdala (Baum, 2006; 
Gooren, 2006; Hines, 2004; Reinisch & Sanders, 1992). Accordingly, this model hypothesizes that if 
a boy or a girl is exposed to sex-atypical levels of androgens or estrogens, this exposure may alter the 
sex differentiation of his or her brain structure in a manner that fosters sexatypical behavior and/or 
same-sex attraction. Proponents of this model cite animal studies finding that sex-atypical exposure 
to androgens or estrogens in utero is associated with sex-atypical behavior and partner choice (i.e., 
male animals show the sexual behaviors and partner choices typically associated with females, and 
female animals show the sexual behavior and partner choices associated with males, see Adkins-
Regan, 2011; Henley, Nunez, & Clemens, 2011; Roselli & Stormshak, 2009; Vasey, 2002).  
Obviously, it is difficult to extrapolate from animal studies to humans, and the direct 
evidence for prenatal hormone influences on adult sexual orientation is limited (for detailed reviews 
and critiques, see Hill et al., 2013; Hines, 2011; Jordan-Young, 2010, 2012; Rahman, 2005). Perhaps 
the most relevant evidence comes from studies of girls with congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), a 
condition in which fetuses are exposed to unusually high levels of androgens in utero as a result of 
disruptions in the synthesis of cortisol by the adrenal gland. Girls with CAH have received so much 
fetal androgen exposure by the time that they are born that they typically have partially masculinized 
genitals, which may be surgically altered at birth. As a result, girls with CAH allow for the 
investigation of prenatal androgen effects on female sexual orientation: If prenatal androgen 
exposure is a primary contributor to female sexual orientation, one would expect all CAH girls to 
develop stable, robust, and consistent lesbian or bisexual orientations, given that they have received 
a far stronger “dose” of prenatal androgens than the average, non-CAH lesbian or bisexual would be 
expected to receive. 
Yet this is not the case. Longitudinal research has found that although CAH girls are more 
likely than age-matched controls to report same-sex attractions, the majority identify as heterosexual 
and report exclusively other-sex attractions and sexual behavior (Meyer-Bahlburg, Dolezal, Baker, & 
New, 2008). Hence, as with the genetic data, the evidence does not support straightforward 
causation. Other human studies investigating the neuroendocrine hypothesis have investigated 
sexual orientation differences in anatomical characteristics known to be affected by prenatal 
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hormone exposure (such as the size of specific brain regions) or on maternal characteristics that 
affect the hormonal milieu experienced by the developing fetus, most notably the number and 
genders of prior births (for reviews, see Bailey et al., in press; Hill et al., 2013; Hines, 2011; Rahman, 
2005). The overall body of evidence is mixed (as critiqued by Jordan-Young, 2012), again suggesting 
that prenatal hormones potentially contribute to same-sex sexuality in some individuals but do not 
determine it. 
 
Can Sexual Orientation Change? 
 
Even if sexual orientation were wholly determined by genes or by perinatal hormones, it 
would not mean that it was immutable, given that immutable means “unchangeable.” Although the 
status of a trait as biologically determined is often conflated with its capacity to change over the life 
course, these are not synonymous constructs. Hence, the fact that genes and/or perinatal hormones 
may contribute to the development of sexual orientation says nothing about whether sexual 
orientation undergoes change, or whether it can be consciously chosen by individuals who possess 
no genetic or neuroendocrine predisposition for it. Issues of change and choice have loomed large in 
debates over sexual- minority rights, going back to Anita Bryant’s anti-gay campaign in the late 
1970s (Rosky, 2013a, 2013b). Specifically, those opposed to sexual-minority rights have historically 
argued that sexual minorities are not, in fact, a normal and natural group of individuals suffering 
unwarranted discrimination but a group that has made harmful and/or immoral sexual choices. 
According to this view, sexual minorities are fundamentally responsible for any social difficulties 
they face as a result of these choices, and society should openly marginalize them to discourage 
other individuals (especially children, as shown in Rosky, 2013a, 2013b) from making the same 
deviant choices themselves. This logic has been directly invoked in debates over same-sex marriage 
(Boucai, 2012): Former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork, for example, argued against same-sex 
marriage rights on the basis that social acceptance of same-sex relationships might induce other 
individuals to choose such relationships (Bork, 2004). 
Setting aside for now the legal and political effectiveness of these arguments (which we 
address later), what is their scientific status? Three different lines of evidence speak to these 
questions. One line of evidence concerns the propensity of individuals to willfully modify their 
pattern of sexual attraction through sexual orientation change efforts, or SOCE (often colloquially 
described as “reparative therapy”). A second line of evidence concerns whether sexual orientation 
appears to undergo longitudinal change on its own, outside the context of therapeutic efforts. A 
third line of evidence concerns whether some sexual minorities themselves perceive that they have 
some choice in their same-sex sexuality.  
Data bearing on SOCE are perhaps the most relevant because SOCE combines the capacity 
for change with the capacity for choice. If efforts to willfully change sexual orientation are effective, 
then individuals with a same-sex orientation can presumably escape discrimination (or could have 
achieved marriage in the pre-Obergefell era) simply by choosing to change to a heterosexual 
orientation. (It bears noting, however, that the majority of individuals seeking to change their sexual 
orientation report doing so for religious reasons rather than to escape discrimination, e.g., Borowich, 
2008; Bradshaw, Dehlin, Crowell, Galliher, & Bradshaw, 2015; Dehlin, Galliher, Bradshaw, Hyde, & 
Crowell, 2015; Jones & Yarhouse, 2011.) In 2009, the American Psychological Association published 
a comprehensive review of research evaluating the effectiveness and ethics of these therapies. The 
findings were stark: SOCE are not only ineffective in changing sexual orientation but are 
psychologically damaging, often resulting in elevated rates of depression, anxiety, and suicidality 
(APA Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation, 2009). Although 
some individuals report satisfaction with the cognitive strategies they have learned for avoiding 
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same-sex behavior and enhancing emotional connections to heterosexual spouses, the same-sex 
attractions themselves remain. (And as noted earlier, it is attraction, rather than behavior, which 
scientists consider to be the key marker of sexual orientation, as reviewed in Mustanski, Van 
Wagenen, et al., 2014.) The APA report recommends that therapists work sensitively to assist 
individuals with reconciling their religious and sexual identity but concludes that therapists cannot 
ethically offer individuals the promise of changing their sexual orientation, given the lack of evidence 
that such permanent change can be therapeutically achieved. 
What about change that occurs outside the context of SOCE? The best and most reliable 
data on “naturally occurring” change in sexual orientation come from studies that have 
longitudinally tracked large, population-based samples of heterosexual and sexual-minority 
individuals (Dickson, Paul, & Herbison, 2003; Mock & Eibach, 2012; Ott, Corliss, Wypij, Rosario, & 
Austin, 2011; Savin-Williams, Joyner, & Rieger, 2012; Savin-Williams & Ream, 2007). Notably, the 
data provided by these groundbreaking studies were unavailable in the 1980s and early 1990s, when 
legal arguments regarding the immutability of sexual orientation gained a boost from the growing 
neurobiological and genetic research on sexual orientation (reviewed by Halley, 1994). At that time, 
not a single large-scale prospective study on the stability of same-sex attractions had been 
conducted. Several such studies have now been completed, and they unequivocally demonstrate that 
same-sex and other-sex attractions do change over time in some individuals. The degree of change is 
difficult to reliably estimate, given differences in study measures, but the occurrence of change is 
indisputable. Sections that follow describe the prevalence and direction of change across the most 
reliable studies; because the succession of statistics can be difficult to digest, a complete tabular 
summary of these findings can be found in Table 1. 
Savin-Williams et al. (2012) analyzed data from the National Longitudinal Study of 
Adolescent Health (Add Health), which has been regularly tracking same-sex attractions and sexual 
identity in a random, representative sample of more than 12,000 adolescents since 1994. We focus 
here on changes in attractions reported between the third wave of data collection (when respondents 
were between 18 and 24 years old, with a mean age of 22) and the fourth wave of data collection 
(when respondents were between 24 and 34 years old, with a mean age of 29). We focus on these 
waves because the measures used to assess same-sex attraction were more specific than at previous 
waves and hence less likely to have been misinterpreted, and also because evidence suggests that at 
younger ages, when respondents were around 16 years old, some of the boys’ ˇˇˇˇˇ reports of same-
sex attractions may have been intentionally capricious (i.e., due to “jokester” youths giving false 
reports; Savin- Williams & Joyner, 2014). 
At the third and fourth waves of data collection, respondents were asked to describe 
themselves as 100% heterosexual, Mostly heterosexual, Bisexual, Mostly homosexual, or 100% 
homosexual. Of the 5.7% of men and 13.7% of women who chose one of the nonheterosexual 
descriptors at Wave 3, 43% of the men and 50% of the women chose a different sexual orientation 
category six years later. Of those who changed, two-thirds changed to the category 100% 
heterosexual. Rates of change were greatest (and transitions to 100% heterosexual were most 
common) among those who initially described themselves as Mostly heterosexual (which was the 
single largest subgroup of nonheterosexuals, accounting for 58% of the men and 74% of the women 
reporting any same-sex attractions). In men, 59% of the Mostly heterosexual group changed over 
the following six years, and 82% of those transitions were to 100% heterosexual. In women, 47% of 
the Mostly heterosexual group changed over the following six years, and 84% of those transitions 
were to 100 % heterosexual. In contrast, only 8% of the exclusively homosexual men and 26% of 
the exclusively homosexual women who initially considered themselves exclusively gay changed 
categories six years later. Of the exclusive heterosexuals, 3% of the men and 11% of the 
heterosexual women switched to a nonheterosexual category six years later. 
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Ott et al. (2011) assessed change in sexual orientation in the Growing Up Today Study 
(GUTS). This study included more than 13,000 youth who were the children of women who 
participated in the well-known Nurses Health Study II (NHSII), a prospective cohort study of more 
than 116,000 registered nurses. Although this study did not involve a random representative sample 
of youth, the size and breadth of the sample contributes unprecedented information on longitudinal 
change in sexuality during young adulthood. Participants described themselves as Completely 
heterosexual, Mostly heterosexual, Bisexual, Mostly homosexual, Completely homosexual, or 
Unsure. Of the 7.5% of men and 8.7% of women who chose a nonheterosexual descriptor at ages 
18 to 21, 43% of the men and 46% of the women chose a different category by age 23. Among the 
same-sex attracted youth who changed, 57% of the men’s changes and 62% of the women’s changes 




As found with Add Health (Savin-Williams et al., 2012), change was most common among those 
with attractions to both sexes (including the bisexual group as well as the Mostly heterosexual and 
Mostly homosexual groups) and least common among those who described themselves as 
exclusively homosexual. Of those who initially described themselves as exclusively homosexual, 10% 
of the men and 33% of the women changed categories by age 23. Of those who considered 
themselves exclusively heterosexual at 18 to 21 years of age, 4% of the men and 6% of the women 
changed categories by age 23. 
The National Survey of Midlife Development (MIDUS) assessed sexual identity at two 
different points in time, ten years apart, in a representative sample of approximately 2,600 
individuals, ranging in age from 25 to 74 (the mean age was 47 at the first assessment). The fact that 
this study asked individuals whether they were homosexual, heterosexual, or bisexual, rather than 
simply asking about their same-sex and othersex attractions, is likely responsible for the fact that so 
few respondents (less than 1% among both men and women) described themselves as homosexual 
or bisexual. Yet among this group 64% of the women and 26% of the men identified their sexual 
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orientation differently 10 years later (Mock & Eibach, 2012). Half of the men’s changes and 55% of 
the women’s changes involved switching to heterosexuality. Similar to the other longitudinal studies 
cited, changes were less common among those with exclusively same-sex attractions than those with 
bisexual attractions: Of those who initially considered themselves homosexual (as opposed to 
bisexual) at Time 1, 10% of the men and 64% of the women changed categories by Time 2. Changes 
were rare among those who initially described themselves as heterosexual; only 1% of men and 1% 
of the women who considered themselves heterosexual at Time 1 changed categories by Time 2.  
The Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development Study (DMHD) is one of the 
longest-term longitudinal studies (although it does not involve a random sample). A birth cohort of 
approximately 1,000 New Zealanders in a single city have been observed from their early 20s to their 
late 30s (Dickson et al., 2003; Dickson, Roode, Cameron, & Paul, 2013). Respondents were asked to 
describe their current pattern of attraction as Only to the opposite sex, More often to the opposite 
sex but at least once to the same sex, About equally to both sexes, More often to the same sex but at 
least once to the opposite sex, Only to the same sex, never to the same sex, or Not attracted to 
anyone. Given the multiple assessments, these data permit us to examine changes between ages 21 
and 26, between ages 26 and 32, and between ages 32 and 38. As shown in Table 1, rates of change 
do not appear to decline as respondents get older. Rates of change in attractions among same-sex-
attracted men ranged from 26% to 45%, and rates of change in same-sex-attracted women ranged 
from 55% to 60%. Among the same-sexattracted men reporting change, between 67% and 100% of 
the changes were toward heterosexuality, and this also was true for 83% to 91% of the same-sex-
attracted women undergoing changes. Overall, changes among men who identified as heterosexual 
were observed in 1% to 2% of men and ranged from 4% to 12% among heterosexual women.  
Given the consistency of these findings, it is not scientifically accurate to describe same-sex 
sexual orientation as a uniformly immutable trait. Although some sexual-minority individuals report 
consistent patterns of same-sex attraction over time, other sexual-minority individuals undergo 
changes: sometimes increases/decreases in same-sex attractions and sometimes increases/decreases 
in other-sex attractions. The question of why such changes occur and why they appear to occur 
more commonly in women than men remains an active and unresolved topic of debate (Diamond, 
2007, 2012; Kuhle & Radke, 2013; Ross, Daneback, & Månsson, 2012; Yost & McCarthy, 2012). 
Qualitative interview studies indicate that women’s changes in sexual attractions are typically 
experienced as unexpected and unintentional, and are often linked to the onset of specific same-sex 
or other-sex relationships (Diamond, 2007, 2008b; Golden, 1987). Neurobiological research has 
documented numerous linkages between the neural substrates of sexual desire and the neural 
substrates of emotional attachment, and one possibility is that the formation of emotional 
attachments may facilitate unexpected changes in sexual desire (Diamond, 2003; Diamond & 
Dickenson, 2012).  
The fact that change appears less common among individuals with exclusive attractions than 
those with bisexual attractions may suggest that exclusive attractions—whether exclusively same-sex 
or exclusively other-sex—are fundamentally more stable than bisexual patterns of attraction. 
Alternatively (or in addition), individuals with bisexual patterns of attraction may have more 
opportunities for the types of experiences (such as transitions between same-sex and other-sex 
relationships) that provide catalysts for change, along with a context in which such change can be 
brought into conscious awareness. 
Social influence, in the form of increased visibility and acceptance of same-sex sexuality, may 
also play a role in longitudinal change. Increases in social acceptance may prove particularly 
influential for bisexually attracted individuals, who may choose to set aside their capacity for same-
sex relationships unless they are exposed to social contexts that are supportive and accepting of 
same-sex sexuality. Arguably, the most supportive and accepting social context for same-sex 
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sexuality would be a household headed by a same-sex couple: if same-sex sexuality can be enhanced 
by social acceptance, one would expect that children raised by same-sex couples would be more 
likely to consider and to pursue same-sex relationships themselves. In fact, this is the case. Long-
term longitudinal research on lesbian-headed families (Gartrell, Bos, & Goldberg, 2011) found that 
lateadolescent girls who were raised from birth by lesbian parents were more likely than age-matched 
controls to report same-sex attraction and behavior. The most likely explanation (given that not all 
of the children were genetically related to their mothers) is that girls raised by lesbian mothers 
experienced a family climate of acceptance regarding same-sex relationships and received less 
exposure (relative to the average female adolescent) to conventional societal pressures to pursue 
exclusively heterosexual relationships. As a result, they may have been more willing and able to 
consider—and to positively evaluate—their own propensity for same-sex sexuality. Of course, this is 
exactly what anti-gay activists have long warned about: Anita Bryant cautioned back in 1979 that the 
agenda of the gay rights movement was to propose to children that same-sex relationships 
represented an acceptable alternative to heterosexuality, increasing the chance that they would 
engage in same-sex sexuality themselves (Bryant, 1979). This may be precisely what has happened 
among the teenagers raised by lesbian-headed families, although contrary to Bryant’s warnings they 
have suffered no psychological, academic, or social deficits as a result (Gartrell & Bos, 2010).  
 Interestingly, the propensity for increased social acceptance of same-sex sexuality to foster 
increased populationwide expression of same-sex sexuality appears to have been happening for 
some time, especially among women (who, as reviewed, show less evidence for genetic heritability in 
their same-sex sexuality and greater rates of longitudinal change relative to men). Mercer et al. (2013) 
analyzed data from three independent administrations (in 1990, 1999, and 2010) of the British 
National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles, each of which used a representative probability 
sample. The 1990 sample contained more than 18,000 respondents, the 1999 sample contained more 
than 11,000 respondents, and the 2010 sample contained more than 15,000 respondents. The rates 
of same-sex behavior among men did not significantly change across the three samples (ranging 
between 6% and 8%). Yet among women there was a fourfold increase in same-sex behavior (the 
rate was 3.7% in 1990, 9.7% in 1999, and 16% in 2010). Similar historical changes have been 
observed in other studies that have analyzed historical trends in the results of populationbased 
assessments of sexual activity. In the Netherlands, reports of same-sex attraction in women have 
undergone a sixfold increase, from 3% in 1989 to 18% in 2009, and women’s reports of same-sex 
behavior have undergone a threefold increase, from 4% to 12%. In men, same-sex attractions have 
doubled from 1989 to 2009, increasing from 6% to 12%, although behavior remained stable at 
around 12% (Kuyper & Vanwesenbeeck, 2009). Importantly, these patterns might indicate historical 
changes in respondents’ experience of same-sex sexuality, historical changes in respondents’ 
willingness to disclose same-sex sexuality, or both. 
In summary, the data on change are relatively clear: Although therapeutic attempts to change 
sexual orientation are not successful, patterns of self-reported same-sex and other-sex attraction 
sometimes change on their own, and the overall social climate of visibility and acceptance regarding 
same-sex sexuality may be one of the factors influencing such change. 
 
Can Sexual Orientation Be Chosen? 
 
The quality of the scientific evidence regarding choice is substantially weaker, because it is 
limited to self-report data on individuals’ personal views of their own sexuality. These perceptions, 
although important and informative, are subject to distortion, bias, poor memory, and limited self-
knowledge. The most rigorous research on sexual-minority individuals’ perceptions of choice was 
collected by Herek, Norton, Allen, and Sims (2010) using a national probability sample of lesbian, 
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gay, and bisexual-identified U.S. adults. Similar to the results of earlier studies using 
nonrepresentative samples (Diamond, 2008b; Golden, 1994; Whisman, 1996), perceptions of choice 
varied markedly across gender and orientation subgroups. In all, 10% of gay men, 30% of lesbians, 
and approximately 60% of bisexual men and women reported having some degree of choice in their 
sexual orientation. 
Of course these data cannot tell us whether individuals are “correct” about having some 
choice in their sexuality, given that different individuals have different operationalizations of choice 
(Golden, 1994; Whisman, 1996). For example, some individuals have reported that they consciously 
decided to think about whether they were capable of a same-sex relationship, and that this choice 
fostered the subsequent emergence and flourishing of same-sex attractions (Golden, 1996). Other 
individuals have reported that they chose to stop ignoring or discounting their interest in the same 
sex, and that once they consciously attended to their feelings they realized that they were sexual 
attractions (Diamond, 2008b). It is difficult to interpret such reports: Can intentional shifts in 
attention actually give rise to novel experiences of same-sex (or other-sex) desire, or do these 
attentional shifts simply foster novel awareness of such desires? This question presumes that 
individuals can “have” same-sex desires without being aware of them, which does not fit the 
conventional definition of sexual desire as a subjective experience of sexual motivation.  
Perhaps a better way to approach the question of choice is to distinguish between one’s 
conscious experience of same-sex desire and one’s capacity for same-sex desire. The latter may be a 
better operationalization of sexual orientation than the former, but the former is typically the only 
way to assess the latter. To get around this obstacle, researchers have used a diverse range of 
objective measures, which are outside of respondents’ conscious awareness and therefore difficult to 
willfully manipulate, to assess men’s and women’s responses to same-sex and other-sex stimuli, 
including neuroimaging, eye tracking, pupil dilation, and genital photoplethysmography (Hamann, 
Herman, Nolan, & Wallen, 2004; Rieger, Bailey, & Chivers, 2005; Rieger & Savin-Williams, 2012; 
Rosenthal, Sylva, Safron, & Bailey, 2012; Rupp & Wallen, 2007; Savin-Williams, Rieger, & 
Rosenthal, 2013). Genital photoplethysmography, which assesses genital arousal by measuring the 
magnitude of blood flow to the genitals, is considered by some to be an objective measure of sexual 
orientation in men but not in women (Bailey, 2009). Its poor utility for assessing female sexual 
orientation stems from the fact that women tend to show “nonspecific” forms of genital arousal. As 
shown by Chivers in a groundbreaking series of studies, women show significant genital arousal to 
both same-sex and other-sex stimuli, regardless of their self-reported sexual orientation (Chivers, 
Rieger, Latty, & Bailey, 2004; Chivers, Seto, & Blanchard, 2007; Chivers & Timmers, 2012).  
Does this mean that all women are “really” bisexual without being consciously aware of it? 
Not necessarily: Discrepancies between one’s genital arousal to a sexual stimulus and one’s 
psychological experience of arousal are common, especially in women, and it is not clear how to 
interpret these discrepancies (Bailey, 2009; Bailey, Rieger, & Rosenthal, 2011; Chivers, Seto, 
Lalumiere, Laan, & Grimbos, 2010; Rieger et al., 2005; Rosenthal, Sylva, Safron, & Bailey, 2011; 
Rosenthal et al., 2012; Suschinsky, Lalumiere, & Chivers, 2009). Further complicating the picture is 
the fact that women show more gender-specific genital responses (i.e., greater arousal to their 
preferred gender) when sexual stimuli consist of static images of exposed genitals rather than 
extended videos of individuals engaged in sexual activity (Bouchard, Timmers, & Chivers, 2015). 
These findings underscore a point made earlier: There is no agreed-upon direct measure of sexual 
orientation, which makes it impossible to interpret self-reports of “choice” (as well as change) in 
sexual orientation. 
For the present time, the most accurate summary of the science is that some individuals 
perceive a role for choice in their sexual orientation and that we do not know what this means. 
Although “choice” is usually presumed to represent the opposite of “biologically based,” no 
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evidence actually suggests that individuals reporting a role for choice in their sexual orientation are 
less “biologically gay” than those reporting no role for choice. Given that genetic and 
neuroendocrine contributions to sexual orientation are not deterministic, one possibility is that a 
conscious choice to consider same-sex sexuality is necessary for some individuals’ biological 
capacities for same-sex sexuality to become manifest. Even more intriguing, perhaps the only 
individuals who can truly choose to be gay (i.e., who can intentionally amplify their experience of 
same-sex desire) are those who already possess a biological predisposition for it, even if they were 
unaware of this predisposition. Clearly, the simplistic notion of “choice” wielded in public debates 
over sexual orientation does not do justice to the complex, variable, and multidimensional nature of 
sexual desire as it is manifested in the mind, brain, and body. 
 
The Gap Between Scientific Findings and Public Advocacy 
 
Given the weight of evidence challenging (or at least complicating) the immutability 
argument, why does it continue to hold sway in public discourse on sexual-minority rights (as shown 
by Stein, 2014)? Some advocates clearly believe that immutability claims are necessary to advocate 
effectively for sexual minorities. For example, Sullivan (1995) argued forthrightly that to achieve 
equality, sexual minorities had to insist on “the involuntary nature of their condition” (p. 170). 
Sullivan’s use of the word condition is notable, given that this word calls to mind the historical view 
of homosexuality as a disease, disorder, or biological flaw(reviewed in Money, 1987; Rosario, 2002). 
Of course, such views are now widely denounced for their suggestion that homosexuals should be 
“cured” or eliminated in the same way that other undesirable groups have been historically target for 
extermination (Khan, 2015). 
To say the least, nothing is inherently progressive about immutability claims regarding sexual 
orientation. And yet, as shown by Stein (2014), the perception that immutability claims are 
fundamentally linked to sexual-minority civil rights is so pervasive that public figures who question 
immutability arguments are reflexively considered homophobic (e.g., Bradner & Jaffee, 2015; 
Copland, 2014; Ford, 2015). Scientists themselves (including the first author) have sometimes 
contributed to misconceptions about the immutability of sexual orientation by failing to challenge 
and unpack these misconceptions in the media, often to avoid having their statements misused by 
antigay activists (see Throckmorten, 2008, 2009). 
After all, the stakes of these arguments can be extremely high: In 2013, President Museveni 
of Uganda asked scientists to provide him with information on whether sexual orientation is an 
immutable, biologically determined trait so that he could decide whether homosexuals deserved to 
be punished for their behavior (Throckmorten, 2013). Museveni was considering whether to sign a 
law that would strengthen the criminal penalties for homosexuality in Uganda, and he did not think 
it would be fair to punish individuals who were born abnormal (BBC News, 2014). More than 200 
Western scientists submitted a carefully worded letter to Museveni, arguing that although there was 
no single cause of homosexuality, it was influenced by a range of biological factors, and was not a 
matter of choice (“Letter to the President of Uganda,” 2014). Nonetheless, Museveni signed the law 
in 2014. (Fortunately, the law was later invalidated on technical grounds.) Since that time, the 
Academy of Science of South Africa has published its own comprehensive report summarizing the 
biological evidence regarding sexual orientation and arguing against the criminalization of same-sex 
sexuality (Academy of Science of South Africa, 2015). The authors deployed the same exaggerations 
of scientific evidence that have long characterized immutability debates, concluding that “all sexual 
orientations are biologically based, largely innate and mostly unchangeable” (p. 22). 
In African nations, these debates have dire implications: Same-sex conduct is illegal in 37 
African nations and punishable by death in seven. When immutability claims are the only way to 
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save lives, it makes both strategic and moral sense for scientists and advocates to highlight scientific 
findings that support these claims. Yet in the United States, the social and legal context is obviously 
more favorable to sexual-minority rights, and immutability claims are no longer necessary, nor 
particularly effective. It is widely believed that individuals will become less prejudiced against sexual 
minorities if they come to believe that sexual minorities are “born that way,” but there is little 
evidence to this effect. Although individuals who perceive sexual orientation as biologically based 
tend to have more positive attitudes toward sexual minorities than those who view sexual orientation 
as chosen or socially influenced (Halsam & Levy, 2006; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Landén & Innala, 
2002; Oldham&Kasser, 1999), it is not clear that born/chosen beliefs actually lead to 
acceptance/rejection. The elegant studies of Hegarty and colleagues suggest that individuals do not 
become prejudiced against sexual minorities because they view homosexuality as chosen; rather, they 
come to endorse notions of homosexuality as chosen as a means of justifying their preexisting 
prejudice (Falomir- Pichastor & Hegarty, 2014; Hegarty & Golden, 2008; Hubbard & Hegarty, 
2014). This is consistent with research showing that the individuals who are most likely to endorse 
notions of homosexuality as chosen are those who have already rejected homosexuality on moral or 
religious grounds (Lewis, 2009). 
Trying to increase such individuals’ acceptance of homosexuality by convincing them that it 
is immutable is unlikely to be effective (as was the case for President Museveni). Moral and religious 
beliefs about homosexuality consistently trump “born/chosen” beliefs when predicting attitudes 
about sexual-minority civil rights (Reyna, Wetherell, Yantis, & Brandt, 2014), and these moral and 
religious beliefs are typically long-standing, deeply held, and unlikely to change on the basis of new 
evidence for genetic or neuroendocrine contributions to sexual orientation. Consider, for example, 
religious groups that have historically denounced both same-sex attractions and same-sex behavior, 
such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (sometimes called the LDS or Mormon 
Church). Over the past decade, the LDS Church has softened its stance toward same-sex attractions, 
acknowledging that such attractions are not necessarily chosen, that they may be inborn (at least in 
this life), and that they are not sinful in and of themselves (Oaks, 1995; Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, 2012). Whether or not this softening reflects increased awareness of the biological 
contributions to sexual orientation, it has not changed the Church’s strict condemnation of same-sex 
behavior and same-sex relationships, and in fact their punishments for same-sex behavior have 
actually grown more severe since the legalization of same-sex marriage (Goodstein, 2015). Hence, 
immutability claims may not be as effective as commonly believed in increasing social acceptance of 
same-sex sexuality. 
This is not to say that these claims have no utility whatsoever. For sexual minorities who do 
experience their same-sex sexuality as early-developing and unchanging, immutability arguments may 
resonate with their experiences and provide them with a meaningful foundation for their self-
acceptance. Also, within highly rejecting contexts (such as a family threatening to disown a gay child 
because they view same-sex sexuality as a moral failing), immutability arguments may reduce 
rejection and stigma by countering the view of same-sex sexuality as “blameworthy.” As Halley 
suggests, immutability arguments respond to anti-gay sentiment with “elegant simplicity and 
plangent appeal” (Halley, 1994). By attempting to bracket the morality of homosexuality, they seem 
to ask the least of those who oppose it (Sandel, 1989). Rather than ambitiously insisting that “gay is 
good” (Feldblum, 2005), immutability arguments claim only that homosexuality is “a normal 
expression of human sexuality,” as the Supreme Court asserts (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015, p. 8). 
Yet these examples simply underscore the fact that immutability arguments have more to do with 
dueling cultural values than they have to do with science. Not only has the relevant science been 
THE JOURNAL OF SEX RESEARCH, 53(4-5), 363–391 (2016) 
	 16 
misrepresented by both sides, but immutability arguments rely on unspoken legal and moral 
premises whose validity must be questioned. 
Before turning to the role of immutability claims in U.S. legal decisions regarding sexual-
minority rights, we want to address a question we expect readers may have at this point: If, as we 
have argued, scientific research on the causes of sexual orientation is not relevant to debates over 
sexual-minority rights, then what sort of science is relevant to these debates, if any? Debating the 
overarching role of science (and scientists) in advocacy for sexual-minority civil rights (and civil 
rights advocacy more generally) is beyond the scope of our discussion, and we refer readers to the 
excellent treatments of this topic elsewhere (Hammack, Mayers, & Windell, 2013; Kitzinger, 1997; 
Kitzinger & Coyle, 1995; Warner, 1999). For our part, we concur with Hammack and Windell (2011) 
that one of the most indispensable roles for scientific research is to convey the lived experiences of 
sexual minorities to lawmakers and judges who may have little firsthand knowledge of these 
experiences. Science cannot and should not be the final arbiter of sexual-minority rights, but 
research on the origins, development, and experience of same-sex sexuality can and should 
contribute to the development and laws and policies that reflect the diverse realities of sexual-
minority lives. 
 
IMMUTABILITY IS UNNECESSARY 
 
Frontiero v. Richardson: Immutability’s Debut 
 
In the 1938 case United States v. Carolene Products, the Supreme Court laid out a basic 
framework for analyzing laws challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. Under this rubric, the 
Court warned that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon 
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry” 
(United States v. Carolene Products Co., 1938, p. 152). Unfortunately, the Court made no attempt to 
identify which minorities were “discrete and insular,” and neither of these terms has been 
meaningfully defined in subsequent cases (Ackerman, 1985). During the 1940s, the Court 
determined that laws discriminating based on race and national origin were “suspect” and would be 
subject to “rigid scrutiny” under the Equal Protection Clause (Korematsu v. United States, 1944). 
Under this exacting standard, such laws were deemed unconstitutional except in the rare 
circumstance that the state could show they served a “compelling” state interest. Until the 1970s, 
however, the Court had still not explained why some classifications were suspect and whether other 
classifications would be subjected to the same standard. In the 1973 case Frontiero v. Richardson, 
the Court signaled that heightened scrutiny would apply to sex classifications as well. Writing for a 
plurality of four justices, Justice Brennan drew a series of analogies between sex and race to explain 
why discrimination based on both characteristics should be subject to similar standards of judicial 
review (Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973). Because Brennan’s opinion marked the debut of 
immutability as a legal concept, it remains influential in today’s debates about whether sexual 
orientation is immutable. Furthermore, because the opinion lays out several reasons for applying 
heightened scrutiny to sex classifications, it is widely referenced to determine the standard for 
reviewing discrimination against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. 
Yet Brennan’s analogies were not all concerned with the immutability of race and sex. First, 
he observed that the nation’s history of sex discrimination paralleled the history of race 
discrimination in significant ways, given that, at different historical moments, slaves and women 
have both been prohibited from voting, holding office, serving on juries, and so on. Second, 
Brennan insisted that women were still being subjected to discrimination in the workplace, in 
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educational institutions, and in the political arena partly because of the visibility of the trait of sex. 
Only after making these points did Brennan argue that sex, like race, was “an immutable 
characteristic determined solely by accident of birth” (Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973, p. 686). 
Because these traits bore no relationship to “individual responsibility,” he reasoned, imposing “legal 
burdens” based on them was fundamentally unfair (p. 686). Yet he also claimed that sex was 
distinguishable from other immutable traits, such as intelligence and physical disability, because sex 
was rarely relevant to a person’s ability to perform a job or contribute to society. Based on the 
collective strength of these analogies, Brennan concluded that classifications based upon sex—like 
those based upon race, alienage, and national origin—were inherently suspect. It is this logic that 
advocates for sexual-minority rights have used in recent debates over same-sex marriage: If sexual 
orientation represents yet another suspect class, then laws imposing legal burdens on LGB 
individuals should be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure equal protection of the laws. 
In future years, judges, lawyers, and scholars began to develop the legal basis for considering 
sexual orientation as a suspect class. Twelve years after Frontiero was decided, the opinion’s author 
argued that heightened scrutiny should be applied to laws that discriminate against lesbians, gay men, 
and bisexuals. In Rowland v. Mad River Local School District (1985), a high school guidance 
counselor named Marjorie Rowland had been suspended solely on the basis of her self-professed 
bisexuality. When the Supreme Court refused to hear Rowland’s appeal, Justice Brennan objected, 
specifically indicating that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation raised similar equal 
protection problems that had been addressed in Frontiero. Yet he did not base this analogy on the 
immutability of sexual orientation. 
Rather, he emphasized the political disenfranchisement of LGB individuals and their 
exposure to forms of hostility and prejudice that had no rational basis (both of which are factors 
that courts can consider when evaluating claims of equal protection). For these reasons—and with 
no reference to immutability—he concluded that state actions taken against LGB individuals should 
be subjected to heightened scrutiny. 
 
The Mutability of Conduct 
 
Brennan’s sweeping proposal to apply heightened scrutiny to laws affecting sexual 
orientation was not to be. Just one year after Rowland, the Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick, 
which dealt a terrible blow to constitutional claims on behalf of LGB litigants (Bowers v. Hardwick, 
1986). In this infamous case, the Court upheld the conviction of Michael Hardwick under Georgia’s 
sodomy law for engaging in a private, consensual act of oral sex with another man. Because the law 
applied to both heterosexual and homosexual conduct, Hardwick challenged his conviction under 
the Due Process Clause, rather than the Equal Protection Clause—as a violation of his fundamental 
rights as an individual, rather than as discrimination against LGB people as a class. Based on a 
misreading of the historical record, the Court rejected Hardwick’s claim out of hand, claiming that 
laws forbidding sodomy had “ancient” roots and that there could be no legitimate assertion of an 
individual’s right to engage in such conduct. Because the law was not subject to heightened scrutiny, 
it could be justified by any “rational basis”—including the beliefs of the Georgia electorate that 
sodomy was an immoral, unacceptable practice. 
Strictly speaking, Bowers was about sexual behavior, not sexual orientation. Because the case 
was decided under the Due Process Clause it did not legally foreclose the possibility of heightened 
scrutiny for sexual orientation under the Equal Protection Clause. As a practical matter, however, 
the door that had once been opened by Frontiero had been slammed shut in Bowers. In 1987 one 
court explained that the two issues could not be distinguished, because sexual orientation was 
essentially defined by sexual behavior (Padula v. Webster, 1987). The logic went as follows: Because 
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one’s status as an LGB individual is based on one’s participation in same-sex behavior, and because 
the Supreme Court allows states to criminalize same-sex behavior, then the Court clearly does not 
view sexual orientation as a suspect class. If they did, how could they have permitted criminalization 
of “the very conduct that defines the class”? Following this logic, several courts rejected the claim 
that laws regarding sexual orientation merited the same scrutiny as laws regarding race and sex, for 
equal protection purposes, and they further rejected arguments for heightened scrutiny based on the 
immutability of sexual orientation. 
In 1989 and 1990, courts dismissed equal protection claims by finding that homosexuality 
was fundamentally different from race, sex, or alienage because it was essentially behavioral (High 
Tech Gays v. Defense Industry Security Clearance Office, 1990). These early cases highlight one 
important limitation of immutability claims on behalf of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals: The 
immutability argument presumes that sexual orientation can be defined by reference to identity or 
attraction, rather than conduct. Yet historically most anti-gay laws have targeted homosexual 
behavior—for example, sodomy and marriage—rather than a claim of identity or same-sex 
attraction itself. In the late 1980s and early 1990s this definitional gap allowed courts to dismiss 
claims about the immutability of sexual orientation on the basis that such claims were legally 
irrelevant: Even if sexual orientation was immutable, these courts reasoned, the law did not target 
“orientation” per se, only its behavioral manifestations. In 1995 one appeals court explained: “Those 
persons who fall within the orbit of legislation concerning sexual orientation are so affected not 
because of their orientation but rather by their conduct which identifies them as homosexual, 
bisexual, or heterosexual” (Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 1995). 
So long as Bowers remained on the books, lower courts continued to define sexual orientation in 
behavioral terms—and to reject equal protection challenges brought by lesbians, gay men, and 
bisexuals on this basis. 
Fortunately, those days are long over. In the past three decades, LGB litigants have racked 
up an astonishing number of victories in state and federal courts—including four landmark victories 
in the U.S. Supreme Court. These victories might give observers the impression that legal arguments 
citing the immutability of sexual orientation have, finally, been successful in securing legal 
protections for sexual minorities. Yet this is not the case. Rather, it is remarkable to see just how few 
of these victories have depended on the immutability argument. Taking the issue of same-sex 
marriage as a case study, we can identify five ways that litigants have commonly prevailed without 
relying on the claim that homosexuality is immutable. These alternative strategies support our claim 
that the time has finally come for U.S. advocates, lawyers, and scientists to abandon the immutability 
argument once and for all.  
 
Winning Without Immutability 
 
It’s Just a Factor. Contrary to the notion that the Equal Protection Clause protects only 
groups who share an immutable trait (as argued in McHugh, 2013), the Supreme Court has 
historically treated immutability as a factor to be considered rather than a requirement to be fulfilled 
(Halley, 1994). Moreover, in some decisions (such as Graham v. Richardson, 1971), the Court has 
applied “heightened scrutiny” for equal protection purposes without making any reference to 
immutability at all. 
Court decisions regarding other stigmatized groups make clear that the immutability of 
group membership is not a necessary characteristic for a group to fall under the purview of the 
Equal Protection Clause. In 1971 the Court unanimously determined that alienage classifications 
were subject to strict scrutiny, just like race and national origin classifications (Graham v. 
Richardson, 1971). Alienage is obviously not an immutable trait, given that many noncitizens have 
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the opportunity to become naturalized citizens (Gerstmann, 1999). Similarly, the Court has also 
applied heightened scrutiny to laws discriminating against children born out of wedlock, even 
though such children could be “legitimatized” under many states’ laws (Gerstmann, 1999; Weber v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 1972). In later cases, the Court has specifically asked whether groups 
“exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them” (Bowen v. Gilliard, 
1987, p. 602; Lyng v. Castillo, 1988, p. 638). By using the word “or” rather than “and,” the Court 
indicated that immutability was not a sine qua non for applying heightened scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
Finally, the Court has repeatedly found that immutability by itself is not sufficient grounds 
for heightened scrutiny. In Frontiero, for example, the Justices observed that laws regarding 
intelligence and physical disability did not merit heightened scrutiny—despite the immutability of 
these traits —because such traits were often relevant to an individual’s “ability to perform or 
contribute to society” (Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973, p. 688), therefore creating a potentially 
rational basis for laws regarding these groups. Accordingly, advocates for same-sex marriage in 
California, Connecticut, and Iowa have successfully argued that the immutability of sexual 
orientation is not required for a characteristic to be considered a suspect classification for equal 
protection purposes, and these courts specifically described immutability as a “subsidiary” or 
“supplemental” factor for suspect class status, rather than a prerequisite (Kerrigan v. Commission of 
Public Health, 2008; Marriage Cases, 2008; Varnum v. Brien, 2009). 
In United States v. Windsor, a federal appeals court forcefully rejected the claim that a 
finding of immutability was necessary to define a suspect class. Rather than asking whether 
homosexuality was immutable, the court asked whether “homosexuality is a sufficiently discernible 
characteristic to define a discrete minority class” (Windsor v. United States, 2012, p. 183). Although 
the court acknowledged that this consideration is often couched in terms of immutability, it insisted 
that the test is broader, focusing on “whether the characteristic of the class calls down 
discrimination when it is manifest” (p. 183). Because “sexual preference is necessarily disclosed 
when two persons of the same sex apply for a marriage license,” the court found that “sexual 
orientation is a sufficiently distinguishing characteristic to identify the discrete minority class of 
homosexuals” (p. 184). 
 
Redefining Immutability. Even in court cases where the immutability of sexual orientation 
has been invoked to support the rights of LGB individuals, the legal definition of immutability has 
been altered in significant ways. In short, the key question is no longer “Can LGB individuals 
change their sexual orientation?” but “Should they be impelled to do so?” At this point, the legal 
answer is clearly no. In a 1989 case (Watkins v. U.S. Army, 1989), Judge Norris of the Ninth Circuit 
argued that the Supreme Court’s notion of immutability, in the context of equal protection claims, 
could not mean “strict immutability in the sense that members of the class must be physically unable 
to change or mask the trait defining their class” (p. 1347). After all, he reasoned, “People can have 
operations to change their sex. Aliens can ordinarily become naturalized citizens. The status of 
illegitimate children can be changed” (p. 1347). Taking this analysis a step further, he added that 
individuals can also change their social status (as a member of a stigmatized group) by simply hiding 
their group membership. 
Yet the fact that individuals possess the option to change a stigmatized trait does not mean 
that they should have to do so to avoid discrimination. Judge Norris went on to argue that some 
traits are “so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a 
person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that change might be” (p. 1347), 
and he maintained that this was the most appropriate definition of “immutable” in the Equal 
Protection context. By way of example, he continued: “Racial discrimination … would not suddenly 
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become constitutional if medical science developed an easy, cheap, and painless method of changing 
one’s skin pigment” (p. 1347).  
In the past decade, Judge Norris’s redefinition of immutability—from a trait that cannot 
change to a trait that is central to a person’s identity—has been widely adopted by state and federal 
courts in same-sex marriage cases. In California, Connecticut, and Iowa, the state’s highest courts 
expressly invoked Norris’s standard to find that sexual orientation was “immutable” and that 
heightened scrutiny therefore applied to laws that discriminate against same-sex couples (Kerrigan v. 
Commission of Public Health, 2008; Marriage Cases, 2008; Varnum v. Brien, 2009). More recently, 
one federal appeals court adopted his rule, along with several federal district courts that have 
invalidated same-sex marriage bans (De Leon v. Perry, 2014; Latta v. Otter, 2014; Love v. Beshear, 
2014; Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 2013; Varnum v. Brien, 2009; Whitewood v. Wolf, 2014; Wolf v. 
Walker, 2014).  
Of course, this new definition of immutability has little to do with Brennan’s original 
formulation of immutable traits as those which are determined “solely by accident of birth” and 
unrelated to “individual responsibility” (Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973, p. 686). It is not a definition 
of immutability at all but a reframing of legal argumentation—from “Can you change?” to “Should 
you have to change?” (Schmeiser, 2009; Yoshino, 1998). Hence, even when immutability is invoked 
in arguments seeking protection for sexual minority individuals under the Equal Protection Clause, 
the legal meaning of immutability has moved far afield from the folk notion of “born that way.”  
Notably, this redefinition of immutability from a trait that is unchangeable to a trait that is 
central to a person’s identity has its own shortcomings. As noted by Halley (1994), and as we will 
discuss further, it potentially excludes from legal protection those individuals who do not consider 
their sexual orientation to be a central and fundamental component of their personal identity (a 
group that is larger, as we will show, than many might expect). It also leaves open the possibility that 
laws penalizing same-sex behavior could be found constitutional because they are not penalizing an 
individual’s “personhood” as a sexual minority individual but simply the public expression of that 
personhood (similar to the rules established in many religious groups, which allow members of these 
groups to openly identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual as long as they agree never to act on their same-
sex attractions). Finally, as critiqued by Clarke, the “new immutability” presumes that some traits are 
more “central” to a person’s identity than others without providing any theoretical justification for 
these determinations, and ends up relying on the same implicit moral judgments about 
blameworthiness as did the “old” version of immutability (Clarke, 2015). Yet the key issue, for the 
present argument, is that even when immutability is successfully invoked to secure legal protections 
for sexual minority individuals, it is a strikingly different form of immutability that no longer even 
means “unchangeable.” 
 
Sex Discrimination. During the oral arguments in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts asked a 
surprising question about state laws against same-sex marriage:  
 
Counsel, I’m not sure it’s necessary to get into sexual orientation to resolve the case. 
I mean, if Sue loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him and Tom can’t. And 
the difference is based upon their different sex. Why isn’t that a straightforward 
question of sexual discrimination? (Transcript of Oral Argument in Obergefell v. 
Hodges, 2015, p. 62)  
 
As the Chief Justice suggested, if his argument were adopted, it would sidestep the issue of 
whether sexual orientation is immutable, or whether sexual orientation classifications satisfy the 
factors articulated in Frontiero. If laws against same-sex marriage discriminate based on sex, then 
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they would be subject to heightened scrutiny on that ground. This particular argument was already 
familiar to scholars studying the battles over same-sex marriage. In every legal challenge brought 
since the 1970s, plaintiffs have argued that laws against same-sex marriage should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny because they discriminate based on sex. In the 1973 case Singer v. Hara, for 
example, two male plaintiffs claimed that if Washington’s marriage law were construed to permit a 
man to marry a woman but not a man, then it would establish a classification based exclusively on 
sex which should be subject to heightened scrutiny under the Washington Constitution’s Equal 
Rights Amendment. In response, the state argued that the law did not discriminate based on sex 
because it applied equally to both sexes (i.e., just as men were forbidden to marry men, women were 
forbidden to marry women). The Singer court upheld the marriage law, reasoning that because the 
plaintiffs were members of the same sex, “what they propose is not a marriage” (Singer v. Hara, 
1974, p. 1192).  
Although the sex discrimination argument was rejected in Singer, it was responsible for the 
first victory for same-sex marriage in an appellate court. In the 1993 case Baehr v. Lewin, a plurality 
of the Hawai’ i Supreme Court issued the first opinion adopting the sex discrimination argument in a 
same-sex marriage case (Baehr v. Lewin, 1993). Like the plaintiffs in Singer, the Baehr plurality 
reasoned that by limiting marriage to male-female couples, the state’s law had established a 
classification that discriminated on the basis of the applicants’ sex and was therefore subject to 
heightened scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution’s Equal Rights Amendment.  
The underlying logic of the equal protection argument is inherently compelling. By 
definition, the concept of sexual orientation depends on the concept of sex (one’s own sex 
combined with the sex of individuals to whom one is attracted). Because it is impossible to make 
distinctions based on sexual orientation without making distinctions based on sex, every act of 
discrimination based on sexual orientation can be defined as sex discrimination. This logical 
relationship is especially clear in the case of laws against same-sex marriage; although such laws are 
intended to discriminate against gay men and lesbians, they achieve this result by classifying couples 
based on sex.  
In recent years, same-sex marriage advocates have bolstered the sex discrimination argument 
by documenting the historical connection between discrimination against women and discrimination 
against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals —especially in the domain of marriage (Case, 2010). Until 
the late nineteenth century, marriage laws imposed sexbased roles on husbands and wives. Under 
the doctrine of coverture, married women were denied the ability to enter contracts, own property, 
or maintain custody of children upon divorce. Once these inequalities were abolished, legal marriage 
became the union of two equal partners. Under this regime, as one judge explained, the exclusion of 
same-sex couples from marriage is nothing more than an “artifact of a time when the genders were 
seen as having distinct roles in society and in marriage” (Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010, p. 993).  
Over the years, this argument has proved only modestly successful: Although numerous 
plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of laws against same-sex marriage by arguing that 
such laws represent sex discrimination, only a handful of trial and appellate judges have accepted this 
argument. In 2013, however, Justice Kennedy breathed new life into the sex discrimination 
argument. During oral arguments over the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, he 
remarked that the issue of whether Prop 8 “can be treated as a gender-based classification … [is] a 
difficult question that I’ ve been trying to wrestle with” (“Transcript of Oral Argument in Perry v. 
Hollingsworth,” 2013, p. 13). Given that Kennedy was widely expected to cast the swing vote on 
same-sex marriage, his remark was carefully noted and deployed by litigants and lower court judges 
in subsequent cases. In the next marriage case to be decided, a federal judge held that Utah’s ban 
against same-sex marriage was subject to heightened scrutiny because, among other things, the law 
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was “drawn according to sex” (Kitchen v. Herbert, 2013, p. 1206). As a result, the judge had no 
need to decide whether sexual orientation was an immutable trait (p. 1207).  
 
Casting Moral Disapproval as Animus. Religious, moral, and social disapproval of 
homosexuality have long been used as justifications for laws prohibiting same-sex sexual behavior 
(Bowers v. Hardwick, 1986; Eskridge, 2008). Since 1996, however, the Supreme Court has been 
rejecting this justification, casting moral disapproval as a form of antigay animus, rather than a 
legitimate state interest. This approach makes it unnecessary to determine whether sexual orientation 
is a suspect class (on the basis of its immutability or other criteria), as it removes the rational basis 
for laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.  
For example, in the 1996 case Romer v. Evans the Supreme Court struck down a law that 
discriminated against LGB people under the Equal Protection Clause. The law in Romer was an 
amendment to the Colorado Constitution known as Amendment 2. Titled “No Protected Status 
Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation,” the law provided that sexual orientation 
(whether defined in terms of identity or behavior) could not serve as a basis for any claims of 
discrimination. In effect, the law repealed a number of existing laws that had protected LGB people 
from discrimination in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and 
welfare services, and it barred any state or municipal entity from adopting such laws in the future. In 
defending this law, Colorado principally argued that it would protect the liberty of employers or 
landlords with personal objections to homosexuality from having to associate with LGB individuals.  
In striking down Amendment 2, the Court declined to say whether all classifications based 
on sexual orientation were suspect, and thus whether they would be subject to heightened scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause. Because the Court found that Amendment 2 could not even 
satisfy “rational basis review”—the most deferential standard of judicial review—it was not 
necessary to determine whether a more demanding standard should be applied. Because the law 
“identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board,” it was “at 
once too narrow and too broad” (p. 633). As a result of this “peculiar property,” the Court reasoned, 
the law was “unprecedented in our jurisprudence” and “inexplicable by anything but animus toward 
the class it affects” (pp. 632– 633). Quoting an earlier ruling, the Court explained: “[I]f the 
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least 
mean that a bare … desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest” (p. 634).  
In the 2003 case Lawrence v. Texas, the Court’s rejection of moral objections to 
homosexuality was more explicit. The law at issue in Lawrence was a Texas statute that criminalized 
“deviate” sexual intercourse (specifically, anal sex) between persons of the same sex. To justify the 
law, Texas argued that it was rationally related to “the legitimate governmental interest [in the] 
promotion of morality” (Respondent’s Brief, “Respondent’s Brief, Lawrence v. Texas, 2003”, p. 
42)—the same interest that the Supreme Court had invoked to justify the sodomy law upheld in 
Bowers. After criticizing the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers, the Court acknowledged that 
although many individuals—over hundreds of years—have expressed powerful and deeply held 
moral objections to homosexuality, this was not a sufficient justification for criminalizing it, and 
thereby intruding into citizens’ private behavior: “[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State 
has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice” (pp. 577– 578).  
Shortly after Lawrence was decided, the one-two punch of Romer and Lawrence produced a 
landmark same-sex marriage ruling in Massachusetts. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 
(2003), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court struck down the state’s law against same-sex 
marriage under the state constitution’s equal protection and due process provisions. Relying on both 
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Romer and Lawrence, the Massachusetts court found that the state’s law failed rational basis review. 
As a result, the court did not need to address whether homosexuality was immutable, or whether 
discrimination based on sexual orientation was subject to a more demanding standard.  
Finally, in the 2013 case United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), a federal law that defined marriage as a legal union between one 
man and one woman. Once again, the Court had an opportunity to say whether laws such as 
DOMA that discriminated against LGB people were subject to heightened scrutiny under equal 
protection principles, on the grounds of immutability or other criteria. As noted earlier, several 
amicus curiae briefs specifically took up this issue, arguing both for (Vargas & O’Donnell, 2013) and 
against (McHugh, 2013) the immutability of homosexuality. Yet as in Romer and Lawrence, the 
Court avoided these issues, invalidating DOMA on more modest grounds. Echoing Romer, the 
Windsor decision emphasized that discrimination could not be justified by “a bare congressional 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group” (p. 2693). With unusual candor, the Court declared 
that DOMA was based on nothing more than “improper animus”—indeed, a desire to “injure” 
same-sex couples by imposing a stigma on them (p. 2693). In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected 
Congress’s attempts to offer moral justifications for the law, such as the claims that DOMA 
reflected “a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-
Christian) morality” and “an interest in protecting the traditional moral teachings reflected in 
heterosexualonly marriage laws” (p. 2693). Closely tracking the holding of Lawrence, the Court again 
found that “no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure 
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect” (p. 2696).  
In short, these decisions demonstrate that a more effective (and frankly, more logical) 
strategy for fighting anti-gay laws is to focus on their “anti” intent. As the Court has ruled, laws that 
seek to injure, stigmatize, or marginalize a group of people—even on the basis of deeply held moral 
convictions—are impermissible, regardless of the characteristics of the group targeted by the law.  
 
“You’re Harming Our Kids!” In United States v. Windsor, the defenders of “traditional” 
marriage trotted out a familiar argument in support of DOMA. Among other things, they claimed 
that the law was justified by the government’s interest in promoting child rearing by both a mother 
and a father. Because of “the different challenges faced by boys and girls as they grow to 
adulthood,” they reasoned, it was “at least rational to think that children benefit from having 
parental role models of both sexes” (Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives, United States v. Windsor, 2013, p. 48).  
Yet in striking down DOMA, the Supreme Court ruled that the law actually harmed 
children, rather than benefiting them. In addition to finding that the law “injure[s],” “disparage[s],” 
and “demean[s]” same-sex couples, the Court declared that DOMA “humiliates tens of thousands of 
children now being raised by same-sex couples” (United States v. Windsor, 2013, p. 2694). The 
Court added that “DOMA also brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples” by raising 
“the cost of health care for families” and denying “benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a 
spouse and parent” (p. 2694). This argument, too, does not depend on any claim that homosexuality 
is immutable —or more broadly, on the application of heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate 
against LGB people. It depends only on the recognition that some same-sex couples are raising 
children. Once this fact is acknowledged, it follows that laws targeting same-sex couples harm these 
children.  
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this particular turn in the trajectory of the 
LGBT movement. For many decades, courts had presumed that the government had a legitimate 
interest in shielding children from any exposure to homosexuality—most notably, to prevent 
children from becoming lesbian, gay, or bisexual themselves. In the name of protecting children 
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from concerns about seduction, indoctrination, and role modeling, opponents of LGB rights such as 
Anita Bryant had defended a broad range of policies that discriminated against LGB people. Yet the 
Court’s analysis in Windsor provides a new and powerful response to the claim that anti-gay laws —
especially those that prohibit same-sex marriage—seek to protect children: Advocates, lawyers, and 
scientists can now effectively argue that the children who need protection are the children of LGB 
individuals, who are harmed and humiliated by laws that codify anti-gay animus.  
 
The Liberty to Choose. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court struck down the Texas sodomy 
law under the Due Process Clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause. In doing so, the Court 
opened up yet another path around the immutability argument, by establishing each individual’s 
liberty to choose same-sex relations and relationships. Throughout the proceedings, the two men 
had challenged their sodomy convictions under both the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process 
Clause—as a form of discrimination against gay and lesbian people as well as an infringement on an 
individual’s liberty to engage in private consensual sexual behavior. Rather than deciding the case 
under the Equal Protection Clause—and thus leaving the holding of Bowers untouched—the 
Lawrence Court clearly stated that it was deciding the case under the Due Process Clause. 
Analogizing the men’s claim to the liberty interests protected in the Court’s reproductive freedom 
cases involving abortion and contraceptives, the Court emphasized that the Texas sodomy law 
sought “to control a personal relationship that … is within the liberty of persons to choose without 
being punished as criminals” (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003, p. 567). From this perspective, the 
immutability of the men’s desire to engage in same-sex contact was irrelevant. Accordingly, the 
Court made no reference to immutability, instead referring repeatedly to the themes of liberty, 
freedom, and choice: “It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this 
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as 
free persons…. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to 
make this choice” (p. 567; emphasis added).  
In subsequent cases, lower courts have applied Lawrence to recognize that laws against 
same-sex marriage violate an individual’s right to marry, which the Supreme Court has long 
recognized as a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. In 2008, the California 
Supreme Court applied Lawrence in holding that California’s law against same-sex marriage violated 
“the right of an individual to establish a legally recognized family with the person of one’s choice” 
(Marriage Cases, 2008, p. 423). More recently, in Kitchen v. Herbert, a federal appeals court applied 
Lawrence in holding that Utah’s law against same-sex marriage violated the fundamental right to 
marry—specifically, the “freedoms—to choose one’s spouse, to decide whether to conceive or 
adopt a child, to publicly proclaim an enduring commitment to remain together through thick and 
thin” (Kitchen v. Herbert, 2013, p. 1212). These rulings show the viability of arguments for same-
sex marriage that focus on the fundamental right to choose one’s marriage partner, rather than one’s 
inability to change one’s same-sex desires.  
For the most part, the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Obergefell offered a ringing 
endorsement of an individual’s liberty to choose same-sex relationships. Above all, the Court 
emphasized that “the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause” because “the 
right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy” 
(Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015). Drawing upon earlier rulings, the Court analogized the freedom to 
marry with other liberties protected by the Due Process Clause: Like choices concerning 
contraception, family relationships, procreation, and child rearing, “decisions concerning marriage 
are among the most intimate that an individual can make” (p. 12; emphasis added). Because the 
freedom to marry resides “with the individual,” the Court explained, “[t]his is true for all persons, 
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whatever their sexual orientation” (p. 13). Summarizing this analysis, the Court concluded: “There is 
no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle” (p. 17).  
In light of this reasoning, it was both puzzling and pointless that the Obergefell decision also 
stated that “sexual orientation is … immutable” (p. 8) and that the “immutable nature” of the 
petitioners “dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to [the] profound commitment” 
that marriage involves (p. 4). If every person has the “autonomy to make such profound choices” (p. 
13), then why should the reasons underlying those choices matter? One man seeking to marry a 
same-sex partner may feel that he was born with a gay orientation and had “no choice” but to fall in 
love with a man. Another man might feel that although he did not choose his bisexual attractions, he 
actively chose to pursue relationships with men instead of relationships with women. Do laws 
against same-sex marriage violate the freedom of gay men more than the freedom of bisexuals (see 
Boucai, 2012)?  
Given that the Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of same-sex marriage, one might 
wonder whether the Court’s casual, scientifically inaccurate references to immutability really matter, 
especially given that they were not invoked as the primary basis for the judgment itself. In other 
words, now that same-sex marriage is legal for everyone, what is the harm if the Supreme Court has 
a view of sexual orientation that is several decades out of date? We are not worried that after 
Obergefell county clerks will require same-sex couples to prove that they were “born that way” or 
deny them marriage licenses if they fail to do so. But the Court’s opinion is a social artifact as well as 
a legal ruling—a widely read text that may influence how LGB people are perceived by others, and 
how they perceive and present themselves (Halley, 1998). In this sense, the Court’s cryptic reference 
to immutability is not only gratuitous but actually harmful. It implicitly presumes that homosexuality 
is inferior to heterosexuality, and it symbolically excludes certain subsets of the sexual minority 
population from the very freedoms and relationships that Obergefell purports to protect. This is the 
argument we take up next.  
 
IMMUTABILITY IS UNJUST 
 
The final and crucial reason to set aside immutability-based arguments for sexual-minority 
rights is that they misrepresent and marginalize those sexual minorities who experience their 
sexuality as chosen, nonexclusive, or variable, implying that these individuals are somehow less 
deserving of legal protection than sexual minorities who experience their sexuality as fixed, 
exclusive, and essential. Also, by making the claim that sexual minorities cannot be held not 
“responsible” for their status, immutability arguments signal fundamental agreement with the 
historical denigration of same-sex sexuality as inherently inferior to heterosexuality.  
 
Who Deserves Equal Treatment?  
 
If the immutability of sexual orientation is used as the basis for civil rights claims on behalf 
of sexual minorities, then what happens to the legal and social identities of individuals whose same-
sex sexuality does not appear to be immutable? The two types of sexual minorities who are most 
marginalized and disenfranchised by immutability arguments are bisexual individuals and those who 
experience their sexuality as variable and/or chosen.  
Individuals with bisexual patterns of attraction and behavior have always posed a problem 
for immutability claims, especially as these claims have been applied to the same-sex marriage debate 
(Boucai, 2012). As reviewed by Halley (1994), courts have interpreted arguments about the 
immutability of sexual orientation to be irrelevant to the “great in between” occupied by bisexuals 
(p. 515), reflecting the widespread view that individuals who possess attractions to both men and 
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women necessarily have some degree of choice over which relationships to pursue (a view which 
some—but not all—bisexuals share, as shown by Herek et al., 2010). As Halley (1994) warned, 
“[T]he fairness theory of pro-gay essentialism does not explain why bisexuals—by hypothesis 
capable of satisfactory sexual encounters with members of the so-called ‘opposite’ sex—should not 
be encouraged or forced to do so” (p. 528), and she further warned that this particular problem with 
the immutability argument would only get worse as bisexual movements and communities began to 
grow.  
Her words seem unusually prescient now: At the time of her writing, in the early 1990s, 
bisexual identities and communities were relatively novel phenomena, lacking the size, political 
power, and visibility of the conventional lesbian/ gay community. Twenty years later, social and 
scientific c awareness of bisexuality, and the development of bisexual communities and advocacy 
groups, has increased substantially. Although it is commonly thought that bisexuals face less social 
marginalization than gays and lesbians because they have access to the privileges associated with 
heterosexual relationships, this does not appear to be the case: To the contrary, bisexuals face 
widespread suspicion, dismissal, misunderstanding, and denigration from both mainstream society 
and the lesbian/gay community (Balsam & Mohr, 2007; Callis, 2013; Kaestle & Ivory, 2012; Welzer-
Lang & Tomolillo, 2008; Yost & Thomas, 2012), and this pervasive stigmatization may account for 
the fact that bisexually attracted and bisexually behaving individuals report higher levels of stress-
related mental health problems (such as anxiety, depression, and substance use) than individuals with 
exclusively same-sex attractions or behavior (Diamond, Butterworth, & Savin-Williams, 2010; 
Dodge & Sandfort, 2007; Gorman, Denney, Dowdy, & Medeiros, 2015).  
The fact that bisexually attracted individuals can choose to form relationships with either 
other-sex or same-sex partners remains a key reason for the animus directed toward them, given that 
the specter of “choice” has been used as a tool to undermine the rights of sexual minorities. If, as 
Sullivan (1995) argued, sexual minorities must secure their rights by convincing the public that they 
bear no responsibility for their “condition,” then the very existence of bisexuals threatens that 
strategy: Even if bisexual attractions are just as immutable as exclusive same-sex attractions, the 
inherent possibility for choice in the behavior of bisexuals undercuts the immutability approach 
(Yoshino, 2000). The very moment that a bisexual man makes a decision about whether to pursue a 
same-sex partner versus an other-sex partner, he conceivably bears some degree of responsibility for 
any resulting marginalization. Although he may not have chosen to be bisexual, he chose what to do 
about it, and can therefore be held liable for making the wrong choice. Note that when we refer to 
“pursuing same-sex partners,” we denote conscious decisions to act on same-sex attractions (and 
romantic attachments) by entering into sexual or romantic relationships, and we do not imply that 
individuals can consciously control the experience of falling in love, or the degree to which they find 
one relationship more satisfying and fulfilling than another.  
Boucai (2012) has eloquently argued that bisexuals actually have more to lose than lesbians 
and gay men in the face of laws which incentivize certain relationships over others. Specifically, 
because bisexuals can choose to pursue either same-sex or other-sex relationships, their lives and 
relationships are the most effectively coerced and channeled by laws recognizing other-sex marriage 
but not same-sex marriage. According to this compelling logic, bisexuals present the most clear-cut 
case of state interference into one of the most personal and private decisions in one’s life: not just 
whether to marry, but whom. Boucai’s argument draws on Adrienne Rich’s (1980) famous notion of 
“compulsory heterosexuality.” Rich argued that women’s “choices” to pursue heterosexual 
relationships were fundamentally enforced by social norms privileging heterosexuality, positing it as 
natural, attaching economic resources to it, and punishing women for deviating from it. In essence, 
when there is such a huge discrepancy between the social and economic costs and benefits of same-
sex versus other-sex relationships, the choice of an other-sex over a same-sex partner is never a free 
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choice. Immutability-based strategies for sexual-minority rights are incapable of critiquing and 
dismantling this DIAMOND AND ROSKY 380 Downloaded by [University of Utah] at 15:57 15 
July 2016 form of social control: How can one protect bisexuals’ ability to choose same-sex partners 
if one fails to acknowledge that such choices are possible? Immutability strategies for sexual-
minority rights do not account for the unique experiences of individuals with bisexual attractions.  
This weakness would be important even if there were only a handful of bisexually attracted 
individuals in the overall sexual minority population, but its implications are magnified by the fact 
that there are far more bisexuals in the population than most people think, rendering their exclusion 
from immutability arguments even more egregious.  
 
The Invisible Majority 
 
Although many scholars of sexuality such as Freud (1920) have suggested that humans are 
innately bisexual, modern sexuality research has generally considered bisexuals to be a small, “fringe” 
part of the sexual minority population, presumably made up of individuals who were in the process 
of transitioning to a gay or lesbian identity or individuals who were temporarily experimenting with 
same-sex relationships (Diamond, 2008a; Rust, 1993, 2000a). From this perspective, exclusive 
homosexuality represents the modal form of same-sex sexuality and bisexuality constitutes an 
exception. Up until the 1990s, there was little reason to doubt this view, given that the majority of 
research conducted on sexual minority populations recruited participants through openly LGB 
organizations, events, businesses, and newspapers, all of which tended to underrepresent bisexually 
identified men and women.  
Today scientists realize how these strategies have distorted our perceptions of the bisexual 
population, now that we have access to large-scale, random, and representative data on the 
distribution of same-sex sexuality in the United States and other nations. Quite simply, individuals 
with bisexual attractions are not “exceptions” within the sexual-minority populations, but the most 
common type of sexual minority. To be sure, many of these individuals do not openly identify as 
bisexual; some identify as lesbian and gay, some as heterosexual, and some adopt no sexual identity 
label at all (reflecting, as discussed earlier, the widespread discordance among the domains of 
attraction, behavior, and identity within the sexual-minority population). But studies assessing 
patterns of sexual attraction (as opposed to identity or behavior) consistently show that individuals 
with a capacity for bisexual attractions outnumber individuals with exclusive same-sex attractions 
(Chandra, Mosher, Copen, & Sionean, 2011; Gates, 2011; Hayes et al., 2012; Laumann, Gagnon, 
Michael, & Michaels, 1994; Mosher, Chandra, & Jones, 2005; Savin-Williams, 2006). For example, 
one large-scale representative study of American adults (Mosher et al., 2005) found that 6% of 
American men and nearly 13% of American women reported attractions to both sexes, whereas 
1.5% of men and.8% of women were exclusively attracted to the same sex (the same basic pattern 
emerged in Chandra et al., 2011). In the fourth wave of the National Longitudinal Study of 
Adolescent Health (when participants were in early adulthood), 6.4% of men and nearly 20% of 
women reported same-sex attractions, and of these individuals, only 5% of the same-sex attracted 
women and 26% of the same-sex attracted men reported that these attractions were exclusively 
directed to the same sex.  
Similar results have been found internationally: A probability sample of approximately 4,000 
British adults found that 5.1% of men and 6% women reported a same-sex attractions; of these 
individuals, only 10% of the women and 20% of the men described their attractions as exclusively 
same-sex (Hayes et al., 2012). In a large cohort study of New Zealanders, 5.6% of men and 15.9% of 
women reported same-sex attraction; of these individuals, 5% of the women and 21% of the men 
described their attractions as exclusively same-sex (Dickson et al., 2003). In a representative 
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probability sample of nearly 6,000 American adults, 7.8% of men and 6.8% claimed to be 
nonheterosexual; of these individuals, two-thirds of the men but only 14% of the women claimed to 
be exclusively gay/lesbian (Herbenick et al., 2010). In a nationally representative survey of more 
than 33,000 men and women, 1.5% of men and 1.4% of women identified as nonheterosexual; of 
these individuals, 78% of the men but only 42% of the women considered themselves exclusively 
gay or lesbian (Sweet & Welles, 2012). In a representative study of nearly 3,500 Swedish youth (17 to 
18 years of age), only 3% of the same-sex-attracted women and 11% of the same-sexattracted men 
considered themselves exclusively gay (Priebe & Svedin, 2013). Among a representative schoolbased 
sample of nearly 4,000 youth in Canada, only 6% of the same-sex-attracted girls and 25% of the 
same-sexattracted boys described their attractions as exclusively same sex (Busseri, Willoughby, 
Chalmers, & Bogaert, 2006). These findings challenge the conventional wisdom that individuals with 
exclusive same-sex attractions represent the prototypical “type” of sexual minority individual, and 
that those with bisexual patterns of attraction are infrequent exceptions. In most studies, the 
opposite appears to be true: among individuals with same-sex attractions, individuals with 
nonexclusive patterns of attraction are indisputably the “norm,” and those with exclusive same-sex 
attractions are the exception.  
Perhaps most interesting of all, a range of studies has revealed that the single largest 
subgroup of individuals with same-sex attractions, among both women and men, is comprised of 
individuals who consider themselves “mostly but not completely heterosexual” (Savin-Williams & 
Vrangalova, 2013). These individuals have historically received almost no research attention, and 
they certainly do not fit anyone’s stereotype of the type of sexual minority who has been harmed by 
the historical unavailability of same-sex marriage. Of course, identifying this population is difficult 
because few large-scale studies bother to ask heterosexually identified respondents whether they ever 
experience same-sex attraction. Yet the studies that have done so provide a fascinating perspective 
on “hidden” bisexual attractions and behavior among heterosexually identified adolescents and 
adults. For example, a random representative sample of more than 12,000 New Zealanders over age 
16 found that 3% of the respondents who considered themselves to be heterosexual reported having 
had same-sex sexual experiences (Wells, McGee, & Beautrais, 2011). A representative survey of 
7,403 adult men and women in the United Kingdom found that 1% of those who considered 
themselves completely heterosexual had engaged in same-sex sexual behavior (Chakraborty, 
McManus, Brugha, Bebbington, & King, 2011). A representative school-based sample of nearly 
2,000 high school students in Quebec found that 5% of the youth who considered themselves 
heterosexual reported experiencing same-sex attractions and 2% reported same-sex behavior. A 
representative sample of more than 3,000 Swedish high school students (Priebe & Svedin, 2013) 
found that 13% of the heterosexually identified boys and 30% of the heterosexually identified girls 
reported some degree of same-sex attraction (1% of the heterosexual boys and 2% of the 
heterosexual girls also reported same-sex sexual behavior). The National Epidemiologic Survey of 
Alcohol and Related Conditions collected data on sexuality from a representative sample of more 
than 34,000 adults and found that 2% of the heterosexually identified respondents reported same-
sex attractions and 1% reported same-sex behavior (Sweet & Welles, 2012). Pooled representative 
data from multiple administrations of the Youth Risk Behavior Survey, yielding a combined sample 
of more than 50,000 adolescents, found that 5% of heterosexually identified youths reported having 
had same-sex sexual partners prior to age 18 (Mustanski, Birkett, et al., 2014).  
In light of such findings, researchers studying sexual orientation have recently begun to 
devote more systematic attention to bisexual patterns of attraction and behavior, whether they occur 
among bisexual-identified, heterosexual-identified, or gay/lesbian-identified individuals. However, 
such studies remain woefully underrepresented in the overall research literature on sexual 
orientation. For example, a recent search of the peer-reviewed social science literature found that 
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from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s only 1% of journal articles focusing on sexual orientation or 
sexual minority individuals had the word bisexual in the title, and only 9% contained the word in the 
abstract. Between 1994 and 2005, these percentages increased to 14% and 35%, respectively, and 
during the past decade they have increased to 20% and 55%. Echoing this scientific omission, 
bisexuals have also received little attention in legal scholarship on sexual minority rights. As argued 
by Yoshino (2000), bisexuals have faced systematic “erasure” from legal and political discourse 
about sexual minority rights, and he maintains that this erasure has been maintained for strategic 
reasons, most notably to stabilize the existing categories of homosexuality and heterosexuality and to 
maintain cultural norms of monogamy. Hence, bisexuals have been altogether absent from both 
scientific and legal discourses about the immutability of sexual orientation and its relevance to sexual 
minority rights.  
Individuals who openly claim to have chosen their same-sex sexuality represent another 
group that is misrepresented and marginalized by the immutability approach for sexual-minority 
rights. Both scientists and laypeople commonly claim that same-sex sexuality is rarely or never 
chosen (e.g., American Psychological Association, 2008; Ghose, 2015), and individuals who claim 
otherwise (or who imply the capacity for choice by using terms such as sexual preference instead of 
sexual orientation) are often interpreted as misguided, insensitive, or homophobic (Bering, 2013; 
Burnett, 2015).  
Yet similar to bisexuals, individuals who perceive that they have some choice in their same-
sex sexuality are more numerous than most people think. As noted earlier, a recent survey 
conducted by Herek and colleagues (2010) found that 10% of gay men, 30% of lesbians, and 
approximately 60% of bisexuals reported having some degree of choice in their sexuality. These data 
are often summarized as evidence that the majority of gays and lesbians do not feel that they chose 
their sexual orientation, but such a summary overlooks the obvious finding that a majority of 
bisexuals do feel they have some choice. It is not surprising that the reports of the bisexuals are 
downplayed, given that claims of choice are perceived to be damaging to immutability arguments for 
sexual minority rights. This perception is so well-entrenched that the LGBT community has openly 
scolded individuals who describe their own sexuality as chosen. For example, actress Cynthia Nixon, 
who developed a committed relationship with a woman in her 40s after an exclusively heterosexual 
history, faced widespread skepticism from the LGBT community for openly claiming to “prefer” 
same-sex sexuality: “I gave a speech recently, an empowerment speech to a gay audience, and it 
included the line ‘I’ve been straight and I’ve been gay, and gay is better.’ And they tried to get me to 
change it, because they said it implies that homosexuality can be a choice. And for me, it is a choice. 
I understand that for many people it’s not, but for me it’s a choice, and you don’t get to define my 
gayness for me … let us stop trying to make a litmus test for who is considered gay and who is 
not…. Why can’t it be a choice? Why is that any less legitimate?” (qtd. in Witchel, 2012).  
There is a long history to the notion of a “litmus test” for sexual orientation, in which some 
sexual minorities are considered to be more “authentically” gay (and hence more deserving of legal 
protections) than others. From a scientific perspective, researchers have historically contrasted 
“constitutional” same-sex sexuality, theoretically attributable to an intrinsic predisposition for the 
same sex, with “facultative” or “opportunistic” same-sex sexuality, theoretically attributable to 
reduced opportunities for othersex contact, prolonged sex segregation, curiosity, confusion, or 
experimentation (Bell, Weinberg, & Hammersmith, 1981; Money, 1988; Muscarella, 1999). 
Constitutional same-sex attractions are presumed to be exclusive, early developing, and 
longitudinally stable, whereas facultative same-sex attractions are presumed to be unstable and 
situationally variable. Laypeople, too, commonly make these distinctions. For example, women who 
pursue same-sex activity in the relatively tolerant environment of college but resume exclusive 
heterosexual behavior afterward are jokingly called “LUGs,” or “lesbians until graduation” (Davis, 
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2000; Kyrakanos, 1998; Rimer, 1993), and are dismissed as curious heterosexuals rather than 
authentic lesbians. The lesbian community has also historically distinguished between primary/born 
lesbians, whose same-sex sexuality is presumed to be more inborn and exclusive, and elective/ 
bisexual/political lesbians, whose same-sex sexuality is presumed more environmentally influenced 
and more bisexual (Burch, 1993; Golden, 1994; Ponse, 1978). In fact, the highest social regard 
within some lesbian communities has historically been granted to “gold star lesbians”—those who 
have never had sexual contact with a man (Queen, 1999; Whisman, 1993). At the opposite end of 
the spectrum, presumably, are heterosexually identified women who “perform” bisexuality in public 
settings to garner male attention (Fahs, 2009).  
Clearly, both scientists and laypeople have observed that there are different types of sexual 
minorities, with different sexual developmental histories, different ratios of same-sex to other-sex 
attractions, different degrees of longitudinal stability in their attractions, and different perceptions 
regarding their capacity for sexual choice. Scientists studying sexual orientation do not know 
whether these differences correspond to differences in the causal pathways underlying same-sex 
sexuality (reviewed in Diamond, 2013; Diamond & Wallen, 2011). For example, there is no evidence 
that someone with exclusive same-sex attractions is more “biologically gay” than someone with 
bisexual attractions. The reasons underlying diversity in the manifestations of same-sex sexuality are 
interesting and important from a scientific perspective, but they should be irrelevant as a matter of 
constitutional law. If an individual seeking to marry a same-sex partner is denied the right to do so, it 
matters little whether it is his first same-sex relationship or his 50th, whether he became aware of his 
same-sex attractions at age 10 or age 30, or whether he feels that his same-sex sexuality is innate or 
chosen. All that matters, from the perspective of civil rights, is whether he has the right to marry the 
partner of his choice.  
When advocates for sexual-minority rights use the immutability of sexual orientation as a 
basis for protection from discrimination, they implicitly convey that the rights of some sexual 
minorities—the early-developing, exclusive, “gold star” types—are more deserving of protection 
than are others. Yet in the prescient words of Halley (1994), “[A]n adequate legal theory should 
protect the entire social class on whose behalf it is articulated” (p. 528). Individuals with complex, 
nonexclusive, unpredictable, confusing, or atypical patterns of same-sex and other-sex sexuality may 
face skepticism and marginalization from the broader LGBT community, but they deserve the same 
respect for their lives and relationships. As posited by Patricia Neal Warren (2009), “Shouldn’t there 
be equal power and dignity for us in ‘choosing’ our orientation, rather than being assigned an 
orientation by chance?”  
Such arguments are increasingly taken up under the banner of queer identity and queer 
theory. Although not a monolithic term, queer is typically used to signal a fundamental questioning 
and disruption of sexual categories and hierarchies, and to acknowledge the dynamic and flexible 
nature of sexuality (Butler, 1990; Duggan, 2006; Horner, 2007; Lovaas, Elia, & Yep, 2007; Owens, 
1998; Plummer, 2005, 2007; Rosky, 2013a; Sedgwick, 1990). Some research suggests that younger 
generations of sexual minorities are increasingly likely to describe their sexual identities as “queer” or 
to desist from sexual identity labels entirely (Savin-Williams, 2005). Other studies find that although 
younger cohorts of sexual-minority youth continue to adopt traditional identities such as lesbian, 
gay, or bisexual, they do so more critically and strategically than previous generations, 
acknowledging that such terms provide only a partial perspective on the complexity of their lived 
experiences (Russell, Clarke, & Clary, 2009). If these historical shifts continue, we can expect that 
future generations of sexual minorities will increasingly use and perceive the terms lesbian, gay, and 
bisexual as heuristics, or mental “rules of thumb,” rather than natural types. Individuals adopting 
this critical stance to sexual orientation and identity are likely to find immutability arguments 
inherently regressive, in that they reinforce the notion of natural, essential distinctions between 
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heterosexuals and homosexuals, rather than challenging the very existence of natural sexual 
categories.  
Immutability arguments also fail to adequately serve the interests of sexual minorities from 
ethnic, cultural, or religious backgrounds that do not share the contemporary Western 
conceptualization of sexual orientation as a defining status designation. Such individuals may believe 
that their status as an ethnic or religious minority is more critical to their sense of selfhood than their 
status as a sexual minority, and that being “born Hawaiian” or “born Catholic” trumps being “born 
bisexual.” Some research suggests that the “multiple marginalization” experiences of sexual and 
ethnic minorities lend themselves to more fluid and flexible notions of identity that can shift in 
response to changing social and community contexts (Chun & Singh, 2010). Valdes (1997) has 
argued that the “ethnicization” of sexual orientation within legal and political discourse (i.e., the 
treatment of sexual orientation as a discrete and permanent trait akin to ethnicity, as discussed by 
Kimmel, 1993) often overshadows analyses of ethnic diversity within the sexual-minority 
population. Culture, class, and ethnicity powerfully shape the lived experiences of sexual minorities, 
influencing the manner in which they perceive and name same-sex desires; the meanings they craft 
of these desires; the opportunities, costs, and contexts of sexual behavior; and their very notion of 
an individual sexual self (Aranda et al., 2015; Consolacion et al., 2004; Jamil et al., 2009; Nazario, 
2003; Parks et al., 2004; Rosario, Schrimshaw, & Hunter, 2004). One telling example of the failure of 
conventional concepts of sexual orientation to represent the experiences of ethnic minorities comes 
from a study analyzing patterns of nonresponse across multiple waves of administration of the 
California Health Interview Survey (Jans et al., 2015). Different ethnic groups were differentially 
likely to skip the question about sexual orientation, and rates of nonresponse varied as a function of 
whether individuals completed the interview in their native language. Such data provide a potent 
reminder of the experiences that are literally missing from mainstream psychological discourses 
about sexual orientation. Thus, an additional reason to set aside immutability arguments for sexual-
minority rights is that these arguments sometimes obscure intersections between sexual identity and 
the dimensions of race, culture, ethnicity, religion, and social class, which give rise to unique and 
varied forms of sexual-minority experience.  
 
What Is Wrong With Being a Sexual Minority?  
 
A final and fatal weakness of immutability arguments for the rights of sexual minorities is 
that these arguments boil down to large-scale apologies or excuses for same-sex sexuality (Boucai, 
2012; Schmeiser, 2009). In essence, they concede the point that same-sex sexuality is fundamentally 
inferior to heterosexuality and simply counter that sexual minorities cannot be punished for being 
born with their “condition” (Sullivan, 1995, p. 170). Indeed, research findings on genetic 
contributions to sexual orientation necessarily raise the specter of eugenics: Might gene therapy one 
day be used to “correct” sexual orientation, or might parents selectively terminate pregnancies on 
the basis of the child’s sexual orientation (Greenberg & Bailey, 2001; Sedgwick, 1990; Smith, 2014)? 
Regardless of whether such future scenarios are plausible, they underscore the degree to which 
immutability approaches to sexual-minority rights are fundamentally linked to—and hence fail to 
challenge—the social reprobation directed toward the “species” (Hammack et al., 2013) of 
homosexuality.  
Immutability arguments also fail to challenge the longstanding anti-gay claim that society has 
an abiding interest in preventing the “spread” of same-sex sexuality, especially to children. The 
protection of children from same-sex sexuality has of course been a long-standing preoccupation of 
many anti-gay activists, who have argued that pro-gay policies and laws—including legalized same-
sex marriage—might make it more likely for children to grow up perceiving same-sex sexuality as a 
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legitimate life choice (Bork, 2004; Bryant, 1979). As reviewed by Rosky (2013b), the classic response 
by LGBT advocates has been that pro-gay legislation cannot possibly foster the “spread” of same-
sex sexuality, since sexual orientation is fixed at birth and impervious to environmental influence. 
This response is obviously scientifically problematic, as the foregoing scientific review demonstrates. 
Yet a deeper problem is that this response passively, implicitly accepts the premise that sexual 
orientation should be controlled.  
This is the premise that activists should challenge, and not the likelihood of homosexual 
contagion. Quite simply, there is no legal or moral basis for states to “contain” same-sex sexuality 
and to actively promote and enforce heterosexuality among children and adults (see Rosky, 2013a, 
2013b). Notably, some judges have already taken this position. In the California district court 
decision striking down Proposition 8, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker specifically addressed the 
question of whether the legalization of same-sex marriage might induce growing numbers of 
California children to adopt same-sex sexuality themselves and concluded that “California has no 
interest in asking gays and lesbians to change their sexual orientation or in reducing the numbers of 
gays and lesbians in California” (Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010, p. 967). The implications of this 
statement are profound, given that it starkly challenges the fundamental premise of anti-gay activism 
in the United States: that there is something wrong with same-sex sexuality. The very basis of 
immutability claims, as best expressed by Uganda’s President Museveni, is that homosexuals should 
be punished for their sexual desires unless they can show that these desires are beyond their control.  
We can turn this argument on its head—and simultaneously make immutability claims 
irrelevant as preconditions for sexual-minority rights—by arguing that same-sex sexuality is nothing 
to punish. If there is no reason for societies to control and contain the expression of same-sex 
sexuality, then there is no reason to invoke scientific research on the nature and cause of same-sex 




In the landmark 1967 case Loving v. Virginia, the state of Virginia sought to defend the 
state’s law against interracial marriage on the ground that “the scientific evidence” on miscegenation 
was “substantially in doubt” (p. 6). Of course, the Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court 
famously held that “[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry a person of 
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State” (Loving v. Virginia, 
1967, p. 12). But in striking down laws against interracial marriage, the Court did not suggest that the 
individuals should be free to marry a person of another race because they “couldn’t help” their 
attraction to other-race individuals or because they possessed an involuntary condition making it 
impossible for them to fall in love with same-race individuals. Rather, it was the fundamental 
freedom to marry a partner of one’s choosing that was constitutionally protected.  
We hold that the same logic applies to debates over same-sex marriage and ongoing debates 
about sexual-minority rights in the United States more generally. Now that the U.S. Constitution 
grants every individual the unfettered liberty to choose same-sex relationships, it simply does not 
matter why these choices are made and whether they were influenced by genes, hormones, society, 
or chance. To suggest that the dignity of a same-sex relationship depends on precisely what caused it 
is not only gratuitous but tragic. Like many other scholars across many other disciplines, we 
maintain sexual-minority rights that are framed as if they depend on scientific findings of immutable 
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